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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1990, Washington embarked on a major revision to the
state laws governing land use planning. Driven by the need to
update Washington planning policies in order to meet the chal-
lenge of rapid growth in the Puget Sound area, the Washington
State Legislature adopted the Growth Management Act of 1990
with further amendments in 1991 and 1992 (GMA).' The cen-
tral features of the GMA require cities and counties to adopt
new comprehensive plans and development regulations,2 estab-
lish urban growth boundaries, 3 increase protection of lands
designated as critical areas,4 and prohibit development unless
transportation systems satisfy certain service standards.5
A primary concern is whether the GMA can achieve its
growth management objectives without violating the Fifth
1. 1990 Wash. Laws 1972, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 17 (amended by 1991 Wash. Laws 2903,
1st Sp. Sess., ch. 32, and 1992 Wash. Laws 1050, ch. 227) (codified at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. ch. 36.70A (West 1991 & Supp. 1993),WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 47.80 (West
Supp. 1993), and WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 82.02 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993)).
2. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 36.70A.040, .070 (West 1991).
3. IM § 36.70A.110 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
4. IM § 36.70A.060.
5. I& § 36.70A.070(6)(e) (West 1991).
1993] Guidance For Growth 1261
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which states as
follows: "Nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation."' The principle is now well estab-
lished that land use regulations may cause a "taking" even
though legal title remains with the private owner. Under the
"regulatory takings" doctrine, a land use restriction may have
such a drastic effect on the owner's interests that the property
is considered taken for public use.7 The constitutionally
required remedy is payment of just compensation.'
Evaluating liability under the regulatory takings doctrine
has long been difficult. The general rule was set in 1922 in
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,9 where Justice Holmes
explained that "while property may be regulated to a certain
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a tak-
ing.1 0 But over fifty years later, in Penn Central Transporta-
tion Co. v. New York," the Supreme Court admitted that clear
standards for determining just what is "too far" were still lack-
ing.12 In addition, the takings issue has been confounded by
doctrinal inconsistencies between the regulatory takings prin-
ciple of Pennsylvania Coal and the conflicting view repre-
sented by the 1887 case of Mugler v. Kansas.3 In sharp
contrast with Pennsylvania Coal, Mugler held that a valid
police power regulation could not result in a taking. 4
Although Pennsylvania Coal was often viewed as rendering
6. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See also WASH. CONST. art. I, § 16 ("No private property
shall be taken or damaged for public or private use without just compensation having
first been made.").
7. See generally Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v.
California Coastal Cornm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393 (1922).
8. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S.
304 (1987). The government may choose to repeal a regulation that is held to effect a
taking, but damages must still be paid for the "temporary taking" that occurred while
the regulation was in effect. Id& at 321.
9. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
10. ld, at 415 (emphasis added).
11. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
12. Id. at 123-24.
13. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
14. Mugler involved a challenge to a state law prohibiting the manufacture and
sale of intoxicating liquors. The plaintiff, a beer distiller, contended that the law
rendered his brewery valueless and sought compensation under both a due process and
takings theory. The decision points out that "all property is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community," id at
665, and that under this principle, "regulating and abating nuisances is one of its
ordinary functions." Id. at 667. The Court upheld the law as a legitimate exercise of
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Mugler obsolete, the Supreme Court nevertheless has, on occa-
sion, continued to cite Mugler without addressing its conflict
with Pennsylvania Coal.'5 Not surprisingly, this unresolved
tension has been a source of much confusion and
misinterpretation.
16
The Pennsylvania Coal/Mugler dichotomy reached its
peak with the Supreme Court's 1987 decision in Keystone Bitu-
minous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictus.17 Although Keystone was
a Pennsylvania Coal "too far" type of regulatory taking case,
the Court quoted Mugler at length' and stated that the early
Mugler era cases were not subsequently overruled by Penn-
sylvania Coal.19 As a result, one court concluded that Penn-
sylvania Coal had been reduced as "a precedent pretty much
limited to its own peculiar facts."20 However, three months
later, the Supreme Court in First English Evangelical
the police power and rejected the distiller's claim for compensation under the Takings
Clause. Id. at 668-69.
15. See, e.g., Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 489
(1987); Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-93 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
272, 280 (1927).
16. The fundamental conflict between Mahon and Mugler and resulting confusion
has been recognized by many commentators and courts. See, e.g., FRED BOSSELMAN,
THE TAKING IsSUE 118-36 (1973); William B. Stoebuck, Police Power, Takings, and Due
Process, 37 WASH. & LEE L.R. 1057, 1063 (1980); Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 170-71 (1985), cert denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987); Florida Rock
Industries, Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
1053 (1987); Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 485 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982).
17. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
18. Id. at 489. The Keystone Court also referenced Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928), where the uncompensated destruction of ornamental cedar trees was justified
to prevent a disease from spreading and destroying valuable apple orchards. See
Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490. However, Miller is distinguishable as being within a narrow
"public necessity/emergency doctrine" applicable to the physical destruction of
property. See discussion infra part II.B.6.b.
Another case relied on in Keystone was Plymouth Coal Co. v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914). Justice Stevens referred to Plymouth Coal as a case
illustrating that a state's interest in safety for coal miners excuses a regulation from
takings claims. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488. However, Plymouth Coal did not involve a
takings claim but was only a procedural due process case. Chief Justice Rehnquist has
correctly noted that Plymouth Coal does not address modern takings analysis issues.
See id. at 514 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
19. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490. Specifically, the Court stated: "We reject
petitioners' implicit assertion that Pennsylvania Coal overruled these cases which
focused so heavily on the nature of the State's interest in the regulation." Id. The
Mugler era cases to which the Court was referring included Hadacheck v. Sebastian,
239 U.S. 394 (1915), and Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171 (1915).
20. Allied-General Nuclear Serv. v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir.),
cert denied, 488 U.S. 819 (1988).
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Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles2 ' strongly reaf-
firmed the regulatory takings principle and stated that Penn-
sylvania Coal was "established doctrine."'
Faced with such conflicting signals from the nation's high-
est court, it is understandable that the Washington State
Supreme Court has struggled recently in attempting to recon-
cile the Supreme Court cases into a coherent set of rules.
Especially illustrative is Orion Corp. v. State,2 which discusses
the divergent lines of authority represented by Pennsylvania
Coal and Mugler.4 In Orion, and later in Presbytery of Seattle
v. King County,' the Washington court attempted to reconcile
this conflict.2 The court retained the basic regulatory takings
doctrine, but narrowed its application using a "threshold
inquiry" designed to screen out most regulatory taking
claims.27 Specifically, the court focused on the public purpose
for a regulation and insulated the government from takings
liability where the challenged regulation protected public
safety, health, the environment, or the fiscal integrity of the
area and did not otherwise destroy fundamental attributes of
ownership."'
However, subsequent to the Washington decisions, the
legal landscape in United States Supreme Court takings prece-
dent has been changed dramatically by the landmark decision
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council." Of particular
21. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
22. Id. at 316.
23. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) (Orion
II).
24. Id. at 645-52, 747 P.2d at 1075-78.
25. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 284 (1990).
26. Id. at 329, 787 P.2d at 912.
27. In explaining the purpose of the threshold inquiry, the Washington State
Supreme Court admitted its concern that the prospect of paying just compensation for
regulatory takings may intimidate legislative bodies from adopting certain land use
regulations. id. at 332 n.20, 787 P.2d at 913-14 n.20 (quoting Orion II, 109 Wash. 2d at
649, 747 P.2d at 1077). Accordingly, the court explained that the effect of the threshold
inquiry would be to diminish potential takings claims and redirect those claims into
due process challenges. Id at 332-33, 787 P.2d at 914. It is worth noting that similar
concerns regarding the spectre of financial liability did not dissuade the United States
Supreme Court from enforcing the compensation remedy. In First English
Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987), the
Court was "not unmindful" of the "inhibiting financial force" of the compensation
remedy upon the "degree of freedom of the land-use planning function." Id. at 317.
However, such considerations "must be evaluated in light of the command of the Just
Compensation Clause." Id.
28. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 333, 787 P.2d at 914.
29. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
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significance is the Lucas Court's discussion of Mugler and the
ultimate rejection of that case as a limitation on the regulatory
takings doctrine. Additionally, Lucas rejects a public purpose/
harm prevention rationale as a basis for avoiding takings. And
finally, an obvious result of Lucas is that the Washington
"threshold inquiry" set forth in Orion and Presbytery of Seat-
tie is now inconsistent with federal precedent.3"
In light of Lucas and the recent constitutionally questiona-
ble Washington decisions, government entities charged with
implementing the GMA may have a more difficult time avoid-
ing takings liability than previously thought. Accordingly, this
Article first seeks to clarify the modern takings analysis as
refined by Lucas. Second, Washington takings precedent is
contrasted with the federal approach and several key changes
are suggested to make state law consistent with controlling
federal precedent. Third, key aspects of the GMA are identi-
fied that can be expected to raise takings implications. By
identifying potential trouble spots in the GMA now, hopefully
some takings will be avoided without resort to litigation in the
future.
II. ANALYSIS OF REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW
A. Historical Background
1. The Early Cases
Early in this country's history, the law became settled that
ownership of private property is not absolute. Rather, owner-
ship is qualified by an "implied limitation" whereby the
owner's use may not be injurious to the use of lands owned by
others.3 Relying on this limitation, early state court decisions
reasoned that a state may adopt land use restrictions that regu-
late or prohibit injurious and noxious uses of private prop-
erty.32 The Supreme Court eventually recognized that this
implied limitation "lies at the foundation of the police
power."3
3
30. See discussion infra part II.B.
31. Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1853); Commonwealth v.
Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55 (Mass. 1846).
32. See classic discussion in Alger, 7 Cush. at 84-86.
33. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Ry. Co. v. Richmond, 96 U.S. 521, 528
(1878); see also Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 667 (1887) (police power "rests upon the
fundamental principle that everyone shall so use his own as not to wrong and injure
another").
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The Takings Clause was not immediately applied to land
use regulations adopted under the police power. Rather, tak-
ings principles evolved from the simple, physical concept of
"direct appropriation" and progressed gradually toward the
more abstract regulatory taking concept.' Accordingly, the
early takings cases were state court decisions that typically
required an actual physical appropriation from the owner.
Even when government actions resulted in significant damage
to private property, the state court decisions often denied com-
pensation because, in the literal sense, there had been no "tak-
ing" (i.e., an appropriation of property by the government).
3 5
The corollary to the direct appropriation rule was that a police
power restriction on the mere use of land was not a taking.3
This limited view was strongly criticized by early commen-
tators. In 1857, Theodore Sedgwick observed that the state
cases that denied compensation in the absence of an actual
appropriation resulted in less constitutional protection than
was afforded by the English government. From Sedgwick's
perspective, justice should have required a broader construc-
34. See Joseph M. Cormack, Legal Concepts in Cases of Eminent Domain, 41 YALE
L.J. 221, 225-29, 260 (1931).
35. See, e.g., Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55; Baker v. Boston, 12 Pick. 183 (Mass. 1831);
Callender v. Marsh, 1 Pick. 417 (Mass. 1823); Coates v. New York, 7 Cow. 585 (N.Y.
1827); O'Connor v. Pittsburgh, 18 Pa. 187 (1851); Green v. Borough of Reading, 9 Watts
382 (Pa. 1840).
In his 1857 treatise on constitutional law, Theodore Sedgwick recounted a number
of state cases where compensation was denied even though physical destruction or
severe injury to property had occurred. THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE
RULES WHICH GOVERN THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 520-23 (1857). Based on this review, Sedgwick concluded that:
"It seems to be settled that, to entitle the owner to protection under this clause, the
property must be actually taken in the physical sense of the word, and that the
proprietor is not entitled to claim remuneration for indirect or consequential damage,
no matter how serious." Id at 519.
36. One of the leading cases was Alger where the Massachusetts Supreme Court
explained that:
[Allthough it may diminish the profits of the owner ... [a land use restriction]
is not an appropriation of the property to a public use, but the restraint of an
injurious private use by the owner, and is therefore not within the principle of
property taken under the right of eminent domain.
Alger, 7 Cush. at 86.
For an excellent and concise review of the state cases that developed the early dis-
tinction between police power regulations and direct appropriation takings, see BOS-
SELMAN, supra note 16, at 106-14; SEDOWICK, supra note 35, at 501, 505-09.
37. SEDOWICK, supra note 35, at 524. See generally id. at 523-24 (contrasting
American cases with the English disposition in similar cases where private property is
damaged as a result of public works such as highway and railway construction).
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tion of the Takings Clause from the very beginning.
s8
Similarly, Justice Smith of the New Hampshire Supreme
Court stated that a misconception of the term "property" was
why a number of early state cases had not applied the takings
provision to police power restrictions of use. 9 Justice Smith
explained that the term property referred not only to land, but
also to the rights of the owner in relation to the land, including
the right of use.4'
The purpose of this constitutional prohibition cannot be
ignored in its interpretation. The framers of the constitution
intended to protect rights which are worth protecting; not
mere empty titles, or barren insignia of ownership, which
are of no substantial value. The constitutional prohibition
must have been intended to protect all the essential ele-
ments of ownership which make "property" valuable.
Among these elements is, fundamentally, the right of use,
including, of course, the corresponding right of excluding
others from the use. . . . "To deprive one of the use of his
land is depriving him of his land;" for, as Lord Coke said,-
"What is the land but the profits thereof?" The private
injury is thereby as completely effected as if the land itself
were physically taken away.41
These criticisms of the state cases were soon vindicated by
the United States Supreme Court. In its first significant ruling
interpreting the term "taking," the Supreme Court in
Pumpelly v. Green Bay & Mississippi Canal Co.Y rejected the
argument that in order to effect a taking property must be
38. SEDGWICK, supra note 35, at 524. Sedgwick states:
I cannot refrain from the expression of the opinion, that this limitation of the
term taking to the actual physical appropriation of property or a divesting of
title is, it seems to me, far too narrow a construction to answer the purposes
of justice... [Ilt seems very difficult in reason to show why the State should
not pay for property of which it destroys or impairs value, as well as for what
it physically takes.
Id. (emphasis in original).
39. Eaton v. B. C. & M. R. R., 51 N.H. 504, 511 (1872). Justice Smith explained:
The constitutional prohibition (which exists in most, or all, of the States) has
received, in some quarters, a construction which renders it of comparatively
little worth, being interpreted much as if it read,-"No person shall be
divested of the formal title to property without compensation, but he may,
without compensation, be deprived of all that makes the title valuable."
Id
40. Id
41. Id at 512 (citing People v. Kerr, 37 Barb. 357, 399 (N.Y. App. Div. 1862)
(Sutherland, J.); Wynehamer v. People, 13 N.Y. 378, 396 (1856) (Comstock, J.)).
42. 80 U.S. 166 (1871).
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actually appropriated from the owner.4"
In Pumpelly, a government authorized dam resulted in the
flooding of private land and thereby "worked an almost com-
plete destruction of [the property's] value."" The Court
explained that the purpose of the Takings Clause is to protect
the rights of the individual; therefore, it would be an unsatis-
factory result if the government could destroy value entirely
without making compensation merely "because, in the narrow-
est sense of that word, it is not taken for public use."4 The
Court added that a literal construction
would pervert the constitutional provision into a restriction
upon the rights of the citizen, as those rights stood at com-
mon law, instead of the government, and make it an author-
ity for invasion of private right under the pretext of the
public good, which had no warrant in the laws or practices of
our ancestors.46
Like Sedgwick, the Court determined that a literal interpreta-
tion would result in less constitutional protection than was
afforded under English law, and the takings provision would
thus become an instrument of oppression rather than protec-
tion to individual rights.47
Pumpelly is significant in Supreme Court takings jurispru-
dence because it establishes at the outset that a "taking" does
not require a direct exercise of the power of eminent domain.
Moreover, the Court recognized that government actions may
result in a taking when the practical effect is to deny the
owner the use of property. The Court stated that "there are
43. Prior to Pumpelly, the Court recognized that states have an inherent
sovereign power of eminent domain, West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. 507 (1848),
and on two occasions restated without significant analysis the narrow view of takings
recognized by state courts. See Legal Tender Cases, Knox v. Lee and Parker v. Davis,
79 U.S. 457, 551 (1871); Smith v. Corporation of Washington, 61 U.S. 135, 147-49 (1857).
44. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 177. The defendant contended that everyone who buys
property on a navigable river purchases subject to the superior rights of the
commonwealth and that the flooding damage is a consequential result of the
government's right to improve navigation. Id.
45. Id at 177-78.
46. Id at 178.
47. Id at 179. In rejecting the literal interpretation, the Pumpelly Court also
expressly stated its awareness of the numerous state cases that upheld various
government projects without redress for damages to private property. The Court
clarified that while denial of compensation was correct in some applications, the Court
was of the opinion that the state cases had "gone to the uttermost limit of sound
judicial construction in favor of this principle, and, in some cases, beyond it." Id at
180-81.
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numerous authorities to sustain the doctrine that a serious
interruption to the common and necessary use of property may
be ... equivalent to the taking of it."'
Hindsight reveals that these considerations foreshadowed
the eventual acknowledgement of the regulatory takings doc-
trine in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.49 Although that
doctrine was not fully acknowledged until 1922, Pumpelly
demonstrates that protecting the owner's right of reasonable
use is necessarily within the historical purposes of the Takings
Clause.
2. The Mugler Era
A key role in the development of takings jurisprudence
was held by Mugler v. Kansas.' The rationale of this decision,
however, is often misinterpreted as supporting a noxious-use
exception to the regulatory takings doctrine. To understand
Lucas' subsequent explanation of Mugler, a close review of
Mugler's historical context is necessary.
Mugler involved a challenge to a state law prohibiting the
manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors.5' The plaintiff, a
beer distiller, contended that the law rendered his brewery
valueless.52 On review, the Court concluded that liquor prohi-
bition was a legitimate exercise of the state's police power
because intoxicants were a source of much "misery, pauperism,
and crime, '"" and that the liquor business "had become a nui-
sance to the community."' Mugler, however, contended that
even if prohibiting the manufacture of liquor was a proper
exercise of the police power, compensation was nevertheless
required for the resulting diminution in value to his property.55
The Court first rejected Mugler's due process theory for
compensation. Although property owners may incur economic
burdens resulting from otherwise valid police power regula-
tions, those burdens were not recoverable under the due pro-
cess guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
48. Id. at 179.
49. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
50. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
51. Mugler presented these arguments in defense to an action brought by the state
for violation of the statute. Id at 653.
52. Id. at 657, 664.
53. Id. at 658-59.
54. Id. at 667.
55. Id. at 664.
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explained that due process was not incompatible with the
implied limitation that property is owned subject to valid
police power regulation.m Similar to Justice Holmes' later
explanation in Pennsylvania Coal that government "could
hardly go on" if required to pay for every change in the law,57
Justice Harlan in Mugler likewise explained that the existence
and safety of organized society could not be burdened with the
condition of compensating individual owners for the pecuniary
losses they may sustain.51 Accordingly, compensation was not
available under the due process guarantee.
The Court also rejected Mugler's takings theory for com-
pensation. In rejecting the takings claim, the Court ignored
the principles expressed in Pumpelly and instead simply
applied the sharp distinction developed in the early state cases
between physical takings under eminent domain and police
power restrictions of use.5 9 The Court concluded that an exer-
cise of the police power for legitimate purposes "is very differ-
ent from taking property for public use."'  The Mugler
decision thus became the leading authority for the proposition
that a police power restriction on the use of land could not
result in an eminent domain taking.61 This view continued to
56. In the words of the Court:
The principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law ... has never been regarded as incompatible with
the principle .. .that all property in this country is held under the implied
obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community.
Id. at 665 (citing Boston Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25, 32 (1877); Common-
wealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53 (Mass. 1853)).
Significantly, the Court did recognize that the Fourteenth Amendment applies
when "it is apparent that [a regulation's] real object is not to protect the community,
or to promote the general well being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to
deprive the owner of his liberty and property, without due process of law." Id. at 669.
57. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
58. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
59. Id. at 668-69. Pumpelly was distinguished on its facts as involving a physical
invasion or practical ouster of possession, whereas Mugler was no more than a use
restriction under the police power. Id. See also Transportation Co. of Ohio v. Chicago,
99 U.S. 635, 642 (1879) (characterizing Pumpelly as an extreme case distinguishable as
involving a physical invasion or practical ouster of possession). The Supreme Court
subsequently applied Pumpelly in several cases involving physical encroachment upon
private property. See, e.g., United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903) (overflow of rice
plantation was a taking); cf Bedford v. United States, 192 U.S. 217 (1904)
(compensation denied where government caused erosion of property).
60. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669.
61. Professor Joseph Sax likewise concluded that the takings issue in Mugler
turned not on the economic consequences of the government action, but on the
qualitative distinction between the police power and eminent domain. Joseph L. Sax,
Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 38-39 (1964). See also John W.
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dominate judicial thinking until Pennsylvania Coal was
decided in 1922.
It is significant that the taking claim was rejected not
because of any special noxious qualities of the proposed use,
but solely because of the distinction between government
appropriations under eminent domain and government restric-
tions of use under the police power. Later Supreme Court
cases confirm that the takings conclusion in Mugler did not
hinge on public health or nuisance abatement objectives, but
turned on the fact that the regulation was construed as a valid
exercise of the police power.62
By effectively blocking Takings Clause review of land use
regulations, Mugler limited constitutional review to substan-
tive due process claims.6 3 When a taking claim was raised, the
analysis often went no further than to recite the Mugler rule
that a police power restriction on the use of property could not
effect a taking."4 Reinman v. Little Rock 65 and Hadacheck v.
Ragsdale, Jr., A Synthesis and Integration of Supreme Court Precedent Regarding the
Regulatory Taking of Land, 55 UMKC L. REv. 213, 227-29 (1987).
62. See, e.g., Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 561 (1906). In
that case, a drainage district required the tearing down of a private bridge so that
available farmland could be increased. The public purposes were purely economic
objectives to improve commerce and the general welfare. Id. at 585. There was no
concern for public health or safety. The owner of the destroyed bridge argued that
this takings claim was different from Mugler because here the government purpose
was not to abate a nuisance or otherwise protect public health, safety, or morals. The
Court, however, rejected that distinction. Under Mugler's broad rule, even where
general welfare and economic purposes are the sole basis for regulation, a valid police
power use restriction cannot effect a taking. The Court stated:
Private property cannot be taken without compensation for public use under a
police regulation relating strictly to the public health, the public morals, or
the public safety, any more than under a police regulation having no relation
to such matters, but only to the general welfare. The foundations upon which
the power rests are in every case the same.
Id. at 592-93 (emphasis added). See also Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380, 398-99 (1895)
(rejecting the argument that public health or nuisance abatement purposes could alone
be a sufficient basis for denying compensation).
63. Regulations were also occasionally challenged on procedural due process
grounds. See, e.g., Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 (1914). In addition,
the rule denying compensation to landowners for consequential damages, except when
property had been actually appropriated, caused some states to adopt constitutions
providing that property shall not be "taken or damaged for public use without
compensation." Richards v. Washington Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 554 (1914)
(emphasis in original).
64. A good example of the Mugler era review is Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S.
678 (1888). In that case, Pennsylvania had enacted a law prohibiting the manufacture
and sale of oleomargarine (imitation butter). The effect was to destroy the plaintiff's
valuable business and render his buildings and machinery useless. The Court stated
that the case was "governed by the principles announced in Mugler v. Kansas." Id. at
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Sebastian," for instance, are classic examples of the limited
review available under the Mugler era.
3. Pennsylvania Coal and the Birth of the Regulatory
Takings Doctrine
Although the recent Lucas decision adds much to our
understanding of the regulatory takings doctrine, the modern
analysis remains grounded in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v.
Mahon.67 Indeed, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council"s
683. Accordingly, the only issue discussed was whether the law was a valid exercise of
the police power. Applying the standard from Mugler, the Court found the legislation
valid because it was not shown there was "no real or substantial relation" to the
legitimate police power objectives of public health and preventing fraudulent sales. Id.
at 684. Once the legislation was upheld as a proper exertion of the police power, the
takings claim was summarily rejected with one sentence at the end of the opinion:
"This [takings] contention is without merit, as was held in Mugler v. Kansas." Id. at
687. See also Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry., 200 U.S. 561, 583-84 (1906); New
Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Drainage Comm'n of New Orleans, 197 U.S. 453, 462 (1905);
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Ry. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 252 (1897).
65. 237 U.S. 171 (1915). At issue in Reinman was a city ordinance prohibiting
operation of livery stables within a densely populated business district. The city
considered livery stables in that area to constitute a nuisance. Reinman, 237 U.S. at
174, 176. Although the plaintiffs alleged substantial losses if required to relocate their
business, a taking claim was not presented to the Supreme Court. Id. at 173. Rather,
the plaintiffs contended that because they had operated the livery business in that
location for a long period of time, prohibiting that use was "unreasonable and
arbitrary" and thus a violation of the due process and equal protection guarantees of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 177. The Court rejected the argument and
explained that regulating the location of livery stables in a thickly populated city was
within the proper range of police power activity. Significantly, the Reinman decision
lacks any takings analysis whatsoever.
66. 239 U.S. 394 (1915). In Hadacheck, a city ordinance sought to abate a public
nuisance by prohibiting the manufacture of bricks within city limits. The effect of the
ordinance was to diminish the value of plaintiff's property from $800,000 to $60,000.
Although the petition alleged a taking without compensation, the Supreme Court's
opinion completely ignores this charge and reviews the ordinance only as an exercise
of the police power under due process and equal protection standards. The Court
pointed out that the only limitation on the police power is that it "not be exerted
arbitrarily or with unjust discrimination." Id. at 411. The Court analogized to
Reinman and concluded that the police power was properly exercised. In Florida
Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States. 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit properly recognized that Hadacheck "appears
to belong to the period when it was held a valid 'police power' regulation could not
also be an exercise of eminent domain. The case generally considered to have broken
with this analysis came later: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon." Id. at 901.
67. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). The modern era in takings jurisprudence is most
significantly marked by Pennsylvania Coal. However, several earlier cases also
illustrated that Mugler's mechanical distinction between the police power and eminent
domain would give way, and that the principles expressed in Pumpelly would be
applied in a larger context. See, e.g., Martin v. District of Columbia, 205 U.S. 135, 139
(1907). See also Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908);
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expressly reaffirms the importance of the 1922 decision. 9
Lucas directs attention to that part of Pennsylvania Coal
where Justice Holmes explained, in a manner similar to the
principles first expressed in Pumpelly, that regulation under
the police power which prohibits the economic use of property
"has very nearly the same practical effect for constitutional
purposes as appropriating or destroying it."70 Meaningful pro-
tection from uncompensated acquisition therefore requires
application of the Takings Clause to use restrictions under the
police power.7
Pennsylvania Coal represents a dramatic advance in tak-
ings law from the narrow rule applied in Mugler.72 No longer
Interstate Consolidated Ry. v. Massachusetts, 207 U.S. 79, 87 (1907); Rideout v. Knox,
19 N.E. 390, 392 (1889).
Among these early cases, the most significant was Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135
(1921), where the Court recognized that the police power may be exercised to restrict
property rights only to a certain extent without providing compensation. Id. at 156.
The question was whether the regulation went "too far." Id.
There were also several early state court decisions that recognized the inherent
difficulty of attempting to maintain the sharp distinction between police power
restrictions on use and takings by eminent domain. See Commonwealth v. Alger, 7
Cush. 53, 86 (Mass. 1853) (stating that it is often difficult to distinguish between the
police and eminent domain powers); Commonwealth v. Tewksbury, 11 Met. 55, 59
(Mass. 1846) (stating that it is extremely difficult to lay down any general rule).
68. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
69. Justice Scalia explained that prior to Pennsylvania Coal, it was generally
thought that the Takings Clause applied only to a direct appropriation of property or
to the equivalent of a practical ouster of possession. I& at 2892. However, in
Pennsylvania Coal, the Court recognized that meaningful protection against physical
appropriations must also include protection against government power to redefine
ownership interests: "If instead, the uses of private property were subject to
unbridled, uncompensated qualification under the police power, 'the natural tendency
of human nature would be to extend the qualification more and more until at last
private property disappear[ed].'" Id at 2892-93 (quoting Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S.
at 415).
70. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (cited with approval in Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at
2892).
71. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2892.
72. It is unfortunate that the majority in Pennsylvania Coal did not directly
reference Mugler or explain how the advance in takings law would affect prior
precedent. However, the break from Mugler is made apparent by the argument
presented by Justice Brandeis' dissent in Pennsylvania Coal. Justice Brandeis
expressly relied on Mugler and Hadacheck in arguing that a legitimate exercise of the
police power cannot be a taking. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 417-18 (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting); see also San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 650 n.16
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (interpreting Brandeis' dissent as arguing the absolute
position that valid police power regulation cannot cause a taking); Florida Rock
Indus., 791 F.2d 893, 901 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("Justice Brandeis' dissent cites Mugler v.
Kansas and Hadacheck v. Sebastian and points out quite clearly how the Court (in
Pennsylvania Coal] is breaking with its precedents.").
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could the takings issue be resolved simply by concluding that
the challenged regulation was a legitimate exercise of the
police power.73 Rather, a regulation must also be analyzed to
determine whether the degree of interference with the private
owner's rights went "too far" and must be recognized as a tak-
ing. That question would ultimately "depend[ ] upon the par-
ticular facts" of the case.74
B. Where are We Now? Takings Law After Lucas
1. The Lucas Facts and Procedural History
In Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,75 the issue
was whether a regulatory taking occurred when a state law
blocked construction of a house on beachfront property. In
1986, David Lucas paid $975,000 for two residential lots,
intending to build single family homes on the parcels.76 The
parcels were zoned for single family residential construction
and there were no restrictions upon such a use."7 Other homes
already existed on lots immediately adjacent to Lucas' lots and
throughout the area.7"
Two years after Lucas' purchase of the property, the South
Carolina Legislature enacted the Beachfront Management
Act."9 Pursuant to the Act, the South Carolina Coastal Council
prohibited home construction seaward of a newly established
setback line. 0 Lucas' lots were entirely seaward of the line.
Construction of any habitable structure was completely fore-
closed8 ' and, at best, Lucas could build a walkway or small
73. See Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 8 Cl. Ct. 160, 170-71 (1985), cert
denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) (reviewing cases since Pennsylvania Coal that have
consistently rejected the Mugler analysis); Morton Thiokol, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl.
Ct. 625, 630 (1984) (stating that Mugler analysis has "disappeared over the horizon");
Barbian v. Panagis, 694 F.2d 476, 485 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982) (stating that "the Court has
retreated from (Mugler] in more recent decisions"). See also Frank Michelman,
Property as Constitutional Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1108 (1981) (stating
that police power servitude met its Waterloo in Pennsylvania Coal).
74. Pennsylvania Coal, 123 U.S. at 413.
75. 112 S. Ct. 2886 (1992).
76. Id. at 2889.
77. Id. at 2890.
78. Id. at 2889.
79. Id. (citing Beachfront Management Act, S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290 et seq.
(Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990)).
80. Id. at 2889-90 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-290(A) (Law Co-op. Supp. 1988)).
81. Id. at 2889.
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deck on his property. 2
The central purpose of the Act was to prevent erosion of
the beach/dune system resulting from construction of houses
on oceanfront property.8 3 The South Carolina State Legisla-
ture found that preserving the beach/dune system was
"extremely important" to the people of the state in part
because the system "protects life and property by serving as a
storm barrier" and "provides habitat for numerous species of
plants and animals, several of which are threatened or endan-
gered."" Lucas did not challenge the validity of the Act as a
lawful exercise of the police power, nor did he take issue with
the public purpose for adopting the Act."
Following a bench trial, the South Carolina Court of Com-
mon Pleas found that the construction ban on Lucas' property
"deprive[d] Lucas of any reasonable economic use of the
lots." The court thus concluded that Lucas' property had
been taken and ordered payment of just compensation of
approximately $1.2 million.8
Relying on Mugler and Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc.
v. DeBenedictus,ss the South Carolina Supreme Court
reversed.8 9 The state court ruled that the significant public
purposes for the Act shielded the state from liability under a
takings claim even though the property owner was denied all
economically viable use of the property.9' The court reasoned
that when a regulation respecting the use of property is
designed "to prevent serious public harm,"'" no compensation
is owing under the Takings Clause, regardless of the impact on
the property owner.92 The United States Supreme Court
82. Id at 2889-90 n.2 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 48-39-290(A)(1), (2) (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1988)).
83. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1991).
84. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2896 n.10 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-39-250 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1991)). Other public purposes for the Beachfront Management Act included
promoting tourism, providing a natural environment for South Carolina residents to
spend their leisure time, preserving the unique beach/dune system vegetation and
generally preventing the effects of erosion. Id
85. Id. at 2890, 2896.
86. Id. at 2890.
87. Id.
88. 480 U.S. 470 (1986).
89. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d 895 (S.C.), rev'd, 112 S. Ct.
2886 (1992).
90. Id. at 898-902.
91. Id. at 899 (citing Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887)). See generally Lucas,
112 S. Ct. at 2890.
92. Lucas, 404 S.E.2d at 899; Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2890.
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granted review. 93
2. The Lucas Categorical Test: Denial of All Economically
Viable or Productive Use
The Supreme Court's takings analysis in Lucas recognizes
at least two situations in which regulatory action is "categori-
cally" compensable without need for further inquiry. The first
is when government regulation compels the owner to suffer a
physical invasion of the property. 4 The second is "where a
regulation denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land.19 5  This second theory was at issue in Lucas.
The Lucas Court held that a taking is categorically estab-
lished when a government regulation denies all economically
viable or productive use of the property. The basis for the rule
is that, from the landowner's point of view, a total deprivation
of beneficial use is the practical equivalent of a physical appro-
priation. 6 In addition, the Court pointed out that requiring
property to be left in its natural state, without economically
beneficial or productive options for its use, creates a "height-
ened risk that private property is being pressed into some form
of public service under the guise of mitigating serious public
harm."9 7 Quoting Justice Brennan, the Court reasoned that
"the benefits flowing to the public from preservation of open
space through regulation may be equally great as from creating
a wildlife refuge through formal condemnation... .,"9' Accord-
ingly, where property is required to be left economically idle in
the name of the common good, Lucas establishes that a taking
93. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 436 (1991).
94. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. See generally Yee v. Escondido, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 1528
(1992) (holding that a physical taking occurs where government "requires the
landowner to submit to the physical occupation") (emphasis in original); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (holding that placement of
cable television equipment on apartment building is an invasion); United States v.
Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (finding a physical invasion of air space); Hendler v. United
States, 952 F.2d 1364 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that installation of wells for monitoring
and extracting migrating hazardous substances and repeated parking of government
vehicles on private property is an invasion).
95. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893. See generally Nollan v. California Coastal Comni'n,
483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S.
470, 495 (1986); Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
96. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894.
97. Id. at 2895.
98. Id. (quoting San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 652 (1982)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
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has occurred.9
a. The Test Does Not Require a Showing of No Value
Three issues need to be discussed regarding the economi-
cally viable use test. First, contrary to the dissent's assump-
tion, the test does not require that property be rendered
valueless.10° The test does not focus on the value of the regu-
lated parcel, but rather on whether any "beneficial or produc-
tive use" can be made of the parcel. 1 1 For example, if a
particular parcel is required to be left in its natural state as
open space or wildlife habitat, without beneficial or productive
options for its use, it triggers the Lucas categorical takings
rule."2 Even though such property is required to be left in its
natural state, the land is likely to retain some market value.
For example, speculators may attach value to the property in
anticipation that someday government restrictions might
change and the property could become economically produc-
tive again. Or individuals and organizations that desire to pre-
serve land in its natural state may have an interest in
purchasing the property for conservation purposes.'0 3 This
residual market value, however, does not affect the takings
analysis.1' To rule otherwise strips the economically viable
use test of all meaning because property is rarely, if ever, ren-
dered completely valueless. Accordingly, the language in
Lucas should be read precisely to mean that a taking categori-
cally occurs where regulation blocks all beneficial and produc-
tive use to the owner.
b. The Relevant Parcel Issue
The second issue concerning the economically viable use
test involves defining the parcel to be considered when mea-
suring whether all productive use has been denied. The
Supreme Court has previously indicated that in some circum-
stances the unit of property to be considered for takings pur-
99. Id.
100. Id. at 2908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); id. at 2919 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2893 (emphasis added).
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Formanek v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 785, 797 (1989) (offers by the
Nature Conservancy and the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources to purchase
restricted property for wildlife habitat).
104. See id at 798 (finding that conservation group's offer to purchase land did not
disqualify takings claim).
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poses is the "parcel as a whole."'0 5 However, the Court later
explained that its prior "verbal formulations do not solve all
the definitional issues that may arise in defining the relevant
mass of property.... ."I' The Lucas decision illustrates that
this issue has not been resolved with regard to the economi-
cally viable use test.
When, for example, a regulation requires a developer to
leave 90% of a rural tract in its natural state, it is unclear
whether we would analyze the situation as one in which the
owner has been deprived of all economically beneficial use
of the burdened portion of the tract, or as one in which the
owner has suffered a mere diminution in value of the tract
as a whole.'0 7
Lucas explains that the Court's prior decisions have been
inconsistent and that there remains "uncertainty regarding the
composition of the denominator of in our 'deprivation'
fraction ... "108
Although Lucas does not attempt to resolve the relevant
parcel question, the Court did suggest that the answer may lie
in the owner's reasonable expectations as shaped by the state's
law of property. Particularly, a court may consider whether
and to what degree the "interest in land" alleged to be taken
has been accorded legal recognition and protection. 09 This
suggestion may provide a rationale for a number of past
Supreme Court decisions in which a distinct interest in prop-
erty (e.g., a right to exclude others or a right to devise) was
105. Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S. 104, 130-31 (1978); Andrus v.
Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65-66 (1979) (aggregate bundle of property rights must be "viewed
in its entirety").
106. Keystone Bituminous Coal Assoc. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987).
The inadequacy of these verbal formulations was clearly revealed in Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1987). Despite the prior ruling in Andrus, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (prohibition
on sale of eagle feathers held not to be a taking), the Court in Hodel held that denial
of a single strand of property interest was a taking. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 718. Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Powell, concurred, but wrote
separately to express the view that Hodel was indistinguishable from the situation in
Allard and therefore concluded that Hodel "effectively limits Allard to its facts." Id.
at 719 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Brennan also wrote a separate concurrence,
joined by Justices Blackmun and Marshall, responding to Justice Scalia by stating that
Allard is not limited to its facts and that Hodel is the unusual case. Id. at 718
(Brennan, J., concurring). In Lucas, the majority indicated that Allard may be
distinguished on the ground that it involved personal property rather than realty.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899-2900.
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held to have been taken, even though the parcel as a whole
remained substantially intact.110
The broader rationale of Lucas provides a further basis for
resolving the relevant parcel question. Lucas reasoned that a
formal condemnation and a regulation that requires property
to be left in its natural state have the same effect on the
owner."' Of course, a formal condemnation often applies to
only a portion of a larger parcel and compensation is required
for the portion taken."2 Similarly, a regulation that denies all
use of a portion of a larger parcel functions like a condemna-
tion of that portion. Thus, compensation should be awarded." 3
This view is supported by American Savings & Loan
Assoc. v. Marin."14 In this case, the United States Court of
Appeals considered the relevant parcel question and recog-
nized that where the challenged government action divides the
subject property into discrete segments by application of differ-
ent zoning designations, the property must be analyzed as sepa-
rate parcels for takings purposes."15 The court relied in part on
Nectow v. Cambridge,"-6 in which a zoning restriction applied
to only a portion of a larger parcel. Based on a finding that
"no practical use can be made of the land," the court invali-
dated the zoning restriction." 7 Several other cases similarly
110. See, e.g., Preseault v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 494 U.S. 1 (1990)
(deprivation of reversionary interest); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (deprivation
of right to devise property to heirs); Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v. Beckwith,
449 U.S. 155 (1980) (right to interest on a sum of money); Kaiser Aetna v. United
States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (right to exclude); United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373 (1945) (mechanics lien).
111. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894-95 (practical equivalence of negative regulation and
appropriation).
112. Compensation will also be awarded for severance damages when the
government condemns only a portion of a larger parcel. Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548,
575 (1897); United States v. 429.59 Acres, 612 F.2d 459, 464 (9th Cir. 1980).
113. There may be situations where portions of a parcel are required to be vacant
and economically unproductive, and yet do not result in a taking of that portion. For
example, a typical building setback from a street, sidewalk, or property boundary is
not a taking. The Supreme Court's suggestion to consider the reasonable expectations
of the owner and the degree to which state law affords legal recognition and protection
of the particular interest in the land may be a sufficient basis to distinguish the typical
building setbacks from other instances where a portion of the parcel is set aside for
achieving a particular public objective. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7.
114. 653 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1981).
115. Id. at 369-70.
116. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
117. Id. at 186-88. The entire tract of land contained 140,000 square feet of which
29,000 square feet was zoned residential. The larger portion of the property was
unrestricted. Id. at 186. The master found that no practical use for residential
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recognize takings of the regulated portion of a larger parcel."18
Ultimately, the Court must resolve the uncertainties acknowl-
edged in Lucas.
c. What Is an "Economically Viable Use"?
A final problem with the "economically viable use" test is
that the Supreme Court has never fully defined the term. One
interpretation, generally expressed by government attorneys,
is that the test requires a showing that no income stream what-
soever is available for the property. For example, suppose a
vacant parcel in a major downtown city is purchased for a fair
market value of $1 million, but it is subsequently rezoned so
that rather than development of an office building, the only
permitted use is for a hot dog stand. The argument has been
made that because the hot dog stand can produce income, the
rezoning action would not result in a denial of all economically
viable use." 9 The problem with this extreme view is that,
while the hot dog stand may be a beneficial use, it is not a "via-
ble" use when considered in light of the circumstances of the
parcel. The better view, and the one that is consistent with the
language of the test, is that the court must consider the actual
viability of a use in the marketplace under the circumstances
in which the property is found when a regulation is imposed.
Therefore, in the hypothetical, the operation of a hot dog stand
is not an economically viable use and, because no other eco-
nomically viable uses are permitted, the rezoning works a
taking.
This interpretation is consistent with Supreme Court
purposes could be made of the regulated portion because there could not be an
adequate return on the investment for that use. Id. at 187.
118. Loveladies Harbor, Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990) (measuring
deprivation of economically viable use by reference to 51 acres rendered unusable
rather than entire original 250 acre tract); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States,
21 Cl. Ct. 161 (1990) (taking of 98 acres of 1560 acre tract); Aptos Seascape Corp. v.
Santa Cruz, 188 Cal. Rptr. 191 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982), appeal dismissed, 464 U.S. 805
(1983) (following American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Marin, 653 F.2d 364 (1981), and
distinguishing Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), as not involving contiguous property
for which different zoning designations were adopted); Fifth Avenue Corp. v.
Washington County, 581 P.2d 50 (Or. 1978) (dividing 20 acre parcel for takings analysis
purposes based on different zoning designations within the parcel).
119. This position was the view of Mr. Robert Liberty, attorney for 1000 Friends of
Oregon, when responding to this hypothetical during questioning at oral argument
before the Oregon Supreme Court in Dodd v. Hood River County, 1993 LEXIS 99 (Or.
July 22, 1993). The audiotape of the March 4, 1993, hearing is available through the
Court Clerk or the Pacific Legal Foundation.
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cases. Indeed, the Court's varied references consistently indi-
cate that the test involves determining whether a remaining
use is profitable, economically productive, or commercially via-
ble. For example, the taking in Pennsylvania Coal was based
on the determination that the regulation made it "commer-
cially impracticable" to mine certain coal.120 In Penn Central,
there was no taking because the challenged regulation did not
interfere with "Penn Central's present ability to use the Ter-
minal for its intended purposes and in a gainful fashion.''
The regulations continued to permit "Penn Central not only to
profit from the Terminal but also to obtain a 'reasonable
return' on its investment."' 22 Similarly, in Nectow v. Cam-
bridge, 12 a residential zoning designation was unconstitutional
based on a finding that "no practical use can be made of the
land in question for residential purposes, because . . . there
would not be adequate return on the amount of any invest-
ment for the development of the property."'124 Many state and
federal courts have also ruled that permitting a reasonable
return on the investment is necessary to constitute an econom-
ically feasible use and to prevent government regulation from
causing a taking.12
5
3. The Ad Hoc Inquiry: Interference with Reasonable
Investment-Backed Expectations
If neither of the Lucas categorical tests results in a taking,
the court next performs an ad hoc factual inquiry into whether
the regulation unfairly shifts public burdens onto private own-
ers.2 Footnote eight of Lucas confirms that this ad hoc
120. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added).
121. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138 n.36 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 136.
123. 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
124. Id. at 187 (quoting findings of master).
125. See, e.g., Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893, 901-03 (Fed.
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1053 (1987) (consideration of fair market value);
Nemmers v. Dubuque, 764 F.2d 502, 504-05 (8th Cir. 1985) (reasonable return on the
difference in value with and without the regulation); Ranch 57 v. Yuma, 731 P.2d 113
(Ariz. 1986) ("reasonable return on the property"); Hornstein v. Barry, 530 A.2d 1177
(D.C. 1987), vacated, 537 A.2d 1131 (D.C. 1988) ("reasonable financial return");
Westchester Professional Park Assoc. v. Bedford, 458 N.E.2d 809, 816 (N.Y. 1983)
("zoning classification will be held confiscating ... if no reasonable return can be
obtained from the property as zoned"); Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 642, 747
P.2d 1062, 1073 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988) ("present, possible and
reasonably profitable use").
126. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24.
19931 Guidance For Growth 1281
review is available even though a regulation does not deny the
owner all economically viable use of the property and does not
trigger the Lucas categorical taking rule. The Court explained
as follows:
[T]he landowner whose deprivation is one step short of com-
plete... might not be able to claim the benefit of our cate-
gorical formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time and
again, "[tlhe economic impact of regulation on the claimant
and . . . the extent to which the regulation has interfered
with distinct investment-backed expectations" are keenly
relevant to takings analysis generally.12?
The Court relied on Penn Central, which established that the
takings analysis will often be an "ad hoc, factual inquir[y]" that
considers factors such as the economic impact of regulation
and the extent of interference with investment-backed
expectations. 28
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stressed the impor-
tance of determining whether the government action unfairly
shifts public burdens onto private individuals.' 29 Most
recently, in Yee v. Escondido,130 the Court again indicated that
it must determine whether ad hoc factors "suggest that the
regulation has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear
a burden that should be borne by the public as a whole."''
Likewise, the takings conclusion should be measured against
this principle to ensure consistency with fundamental notions
127. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8 (quoting Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124).
128. Penn Central also identifies the "character of governmental action" as a
factor to be considered. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124. However, Penn Central
indicates that this factor merely recognizes the distinction between governmental
action that causes a physical invasion and governmental action of a regulatory
character, noting that a taking is more readily found in the physical invasion context.
Id. Accordingly, Lucas correctly omits this distinction from the ad hoc inquiry because
it is already understood that the subject matter is a use restriction, not a physical
occupation taking. Of course, the character and purpose of a regulation may still have
a bearing in showing that public burdens are unfairly shifted onto the shoulders of
individuals.
129. In Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960), the Court explained that
the Takings Clause "was designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone
to bear public burdens that, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as
a whole." Id. at 49. See also Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123-24 (following Armstrong);
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835-36 n.4 (citing Armstrong as setting forth one of the "principal"
rationales for the Takings Clause); Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 416 (stating that
"the question at bottom is upon whom the changes desired should fall"); First Church,
482 U.S. at 318 (referring to the Armstrong principle as "axiomatic").
130. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
131. Id. at 1526.
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of fairness and justice and to prevent government from shift-
ing public burdens and objectives onto private owners.
4. The Substantial Advancement Test
In addition to the above grounds, Agins v. Tiburon
13 2
established that a taking also occurs if a land use regulation
fails to substantially advance legitimate state interests. This
test provides an independent ground on which to base a
taking.
3 3
The substantial advancement test appears more like a due
process test than a takings test. Indeed, the language derives
from the substantive due process standard employed in Nectow
v. Cambridge'34 and Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty. 3 5
Like due process review, the test considers the means (sub-
stantially advance) and purposes (legitimate state interests) of
the challenged regulation. However, despite its origins and
similar character, the Supreme Court has recognized that this
standard is a takings test, not a due process test. In effect, the
test represents a blending of some due process principles into
takings law.' 36
However, because it is a takings test, the substantially
advance standard involves a higher degree of judicial scrutiny
than the rational basis standard employed in substantive due
process review. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,37
the Supreme Court explained:
132. 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
133. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1532 (stating that the allegation that a regulation does not
substantially advance a legitimate state interest "does not depend on the extent to
which petitioners are deprived of the economic use of their particular pieces of
property .. "). Nollan also illustrates that where a regulation fails to substantially
advance legitimate purposes, the takings conclusion is not altered by the fact that
there may remain an economically viable use of the property. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830.
134. 277 U.S. 183, 188 (1928) (holding that a land use restriction cannot be imposed
if it does not bear a substantial relation to the public interest).
135. 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926).
136. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. 183 (1928)); see also Penn
Central, 438 U.S. at 127 (stating that a "use restriction . . . on real property may
constitute a 'taking' if not reasonably necessary to the effectuation of a substantial
public purpose."). Penn Central refers to language in Justice Stevens' dissent in Moore
v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), where Stevens explained that the due process
and takings guarantees were "fused" into a single standard. Id at 514 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. 183 (1928); Euclid, 272 U.S. 365 (1926)).
137. 483 U.S. 825 (1987). For a second application of Agins' substantially advance
standard, see Justice Scalia's dissent in Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 15-24 (1988)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
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[Olur opinions do not establish that these standards are the
same as those applied to due process or equal protection
claims. To the contrary, our verbal formulations in the tak-
ings field have generally been quite different. We have
required that the regulation "substantially advance" the
"legitimate state interest" sought to be achieved, not that
"the State 'could rationally have decided' that the measure
adopted might achieve the State's objective."'
' 33
The heightened scrutiny applicable to takings claims
ensures that the police power is not used as a disguised means
to take property without paying compensation. Nollan
explains that when property rights are restricted through
police power regulations, there is a risk that the government
chose to use regulatory power instead of the eminent domain
power simply to avoid the compensation requirement of the
Fifth Amendment. 9 Accordingly, courts apply the substan-
tially advance standard to determine whether the police power
is legitimately being used to regulate rather than to take prop-
erty without compensation.
140
138. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834 n.3 (citations omitted; emphasis in original). See also
Seawall Assoc. v. New York, 542 N.E.2d 1059, 1068 (N.Y.), cert denied, 493 U.S. 976
(1989) (Nollan requires semi-strict or heightened scrutiny); Surfside Colony, Ltd. v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 277 Cal. Rptr. 371, 377 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("Nollan,
however, changed the standard of constitutional review in takings cases. Whether the
new standard be described as 'substantial relationship,' or 'heightened scrutiny,' it is
clear the rational basis test ... no longer controls." (footnotes omitted)); but see
Commercial Builders of Northern California v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 874 (9th Cir.
1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992); Blue Jeans Equities West v. San Francisco, 4
Cal. Rptr. 2d 114, 118 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992).
139. The Court stated:
We view the Fifth Amendment's Property Clause to be more than a pleading
requirement, and compliance with it to be more than an exercise in cleverness
and imagination. As indicated earlier, our cases describe the condition for
abridgment of property rights through the police power as a "substantial
advanc[ing]" of a legitimate state interest. We are inclined to be particularly
careful about the adjective where the actual conveyance of property is made a
condition to the lifting of a land use restriction, since in that context there is
heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the compensation
requirement, rather than the stated police power objective.
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841 (emphasis in original). See also Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895
("[Rlegulations that leave the owner of land without economically beneficial or pro-
ductive options for its use... carry with them a heightened risk that private property
is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm.") (emphasis added).
140. For example, in Nollan, the California Coastal Commission purported to be
exercising its regulatory power over development along the coast. However, close
scrutiny revealed that the public access condition did not address regulatory concerns
related to the proposed development, but was in fact an attempt to use the regulatory
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Although the test can be applied to any land use regula-
tion, the most common application is to review the constitu-
tionality of exactions imposed on property owners as a
condition of receiving a development permit.141 Under the sub-
stantially advance test, an exaction must bear an "essential
nexus" to the mitigation of harms caused by the proposed pro-
ject.14 If the exaction is unrelated to mitigating legitimate
concerns related to the project, the purpose for imposing the
exaction is not regulatory, but confiscatory, and the exaction
will therefore fail to substantially advance a legitimate regula-
tory objective and will result in a taking.'
43
5. Lucas' Rejection of Mugler and the "Public Purpose"
Rationale for Denying Compensation
A key aspect of the Lucas decision is its clarification of
Mugler v. Kansas'" and other early takings cases. Although
decided over a century ago, Mugler causes much of the present
day confusion regarding regulatory takings. Indeed, Mugler's
distinction between police power regulations and eminent
domain 45 has at times been misconstrued as supporting some
type of "noxious use" or "harm prevention" exception to the
modern takings analysis. 14 However, Lucas finally explains
that the harmful or noxious use principle embodied in the
Mugler era cases was merely the Court's early formulation of
the justification for imposing police power regulations on pri-
vate land. 47 While prevention of harmful use provides a justi-
fication for the exercise of the police power, Lucas explains
that the "noxious use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to dis-
tinguish regulatory 'takings'... ,,14s
power to acquire an easement over property without providing compensation. See
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837-39.
141. See, e.g., Commercial Builders of Northern California v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d
872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992); Surfside Colony Ltd. v.
California Coastal Comm'n, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1260 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Unlimited v.
Kitsap County, 50 Wash. App. 723, 750 P.2d 651, rev. denied, 111 Wash. 2d 1008 (1988).
142. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 836-37.
143. Id.
144. 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
145. See discussion supra part II.A.
146. See, e.g., Allied-General Nuclear Services v. United States, 839 F.2d 1572, 1576
(Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 820 (1988); First English Evangelical Lutheran
Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles, 258 Cal. Rptr. 893, 898-99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989),
cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1056 (1990).
147. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898-99.
148. Id. at 2899. The Court also explained that it had already rejected the view
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Lucas also clarified the applicability of the "implied limita-
tion" that the owner's use of property shall not be injurious to
the use of others. 149  The South Carolina Coastal Council
argued that because property is held subject to this implied
limitation, the state may, through regulation, eliminate all eco-
nomically viable use of property provided the regulation is
characterized as preventing harmful or noxious uses.1' ° The
Court rejected this interpretation of the implied limitation.
Justice Scalia explained that the position advocated by the
Coastal Council was "inconsistent with the historical compact
recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our
constitutional culture."'' In effect, the Lucas response reaf-
firmed Pennsylvania Coal, in which Justice Holmes explained
that while "some values are enjoyed under an implied limita-
tion, and must yield to the police power.., the implied limita-
tion must have its limits.' 5 2  Pennsylvania Coal therefore
established that one of those limits is the regulatory takings
doctrine.
In addition to rejecting the idea that Mugler and the
implied limitation principle limited takings liability, 53 Lucas
that Mugler and its progeny were premised on any noxiousness concepts. Id at 2897
(citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 133-34 n.30).
149. See discussion supra part II.A.
150. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
151. Id.
152. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413. The Court reasoned in part that
unchecked expansion of the police power would eventually lead to the abrogation of
private property. Id at 415.
153. The Mugler era cases may continue to have some limited applicability in the
takings field. Specifically, the cases may assist in the Agins determination of whether
a regulation substantially advances a legitimate state interest. Lucas states that the
harmful or noxious use principle of Mugler was "simply the progenitor" of the more
contemporary statement that a taking occurs where regulation fails to "substantially
advance legitimate state interests." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897; cf. Mugler, 123 U.S. at
661 (stating that statute must have a "real and substantial relation" to legitimate
objectives of government). This limited viability of Mugler makes sense because the
Agins substantial advancement test involves a blending of substantive due process
principles into the takings analysis.
Significantly, in Keystone, the Court stated that the Mugler era cases were not
subsequently overruled by Pennsylvania Coal. Keystone, 480 U.S. at 490. However,
the application of the Mugler era precedents applied only to the analysis under the
Agins substantial advancement test. Id. at 485-93. The Court went on to separately
analyze the degree of interference with the use and value of the coal deposits, and
Mugler was of no concern to that discussion. Id. at 485, 493-502. See also Whitney
Benefits, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1176-77 n.10 (Fed. Cir.) (recognizing
limited applicability of Mugler and that Keystone separately considered whether there
was a denial of economic use), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991).
By limiting any continued relevance of Mugler to the inquiry under the
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also addressed the contention that the protection of public
safety and prevention of beach erosion and loss of wildlife
habitat were public purposes that justified insulating the state
from takings liability. The Court rejected such insulation theo-
ries. Lucas explains that the difference between a "harm-
preventing" regulation and a benefit-conferring regulation is
"often in the eye of the beholder. ' ' "M For example, the Beach-
front Management Act at issue in Lucas could be described as
either preventing harm to South Carolina's ecological
resources or as conferring upon the state the "benefits" of an
ecological preserve. 55  Because the same interests can be
described in either fashion, Lucas explained that it would be
pointless to have the outcome of the case hang on such harm
prevention terminology."5
The Court further reasoned that if a noxious use justifica-
tion could insulate regulations from the compensation require-
ment, such insulation "would virtually always be allowed.'
'1 57
Because a noxious use justification can be created for practi-
cally every land use regulation, the test would be nothing more
than "a test of whether the legislature had a stupid staff."'"
Such an approach would nullify the regulatory takings doc-
trine as a limit to the exercise of the police power.' 59 The
substantial advancement test, the doctrinal conflict between Mugler, Pennsylvania
Coal, and Keystone goes away. To the extent that the Mugler-era cases demonstrate
what kind of land use regulations are legitimate exercises of the police power, Keystone
correctly notes that Pennsylvania Coal did not overrule them. However, as to whether
an otherwise legitimate regulation goes too far, based on the degree of interference
with private use and value, Mugler must continue to be recognized as irrelevant and its
contrary holding obsolete.
154. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2897.
155. Id. at 2898.
156. Id. at 2898 n.11.
157. Id. at 2899.
158. Id. at 2898 n.12.
An example of how virtually any land use regulation may be cast in substantial
harm-preventing characterizations is found in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 235 (1980).
The city council there adopted an open space and zoning ordinance to help protect the
city residents from the "ill-effects of urbanization." Id. at 261. The city council found
that the ordinance was
in the public interest to avoid unnecessary conversion of open space land to
strictly urban uses, thereby protecting against the resultant adverse impacts,
such as air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic
beauty, disturbance of the ecology and environment, hazards related to
geology, fire, and flood, and other demonstrated consequences of urban
sprawl.
I& at 261 n.8.
159. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
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Lucas Court thus rejected the harm prevention rationale as a
limitation of takings liability.
6. Special Cases: No Takings Liability Where Pre-existing
Limitations Preclude Compensation
One of the most intriguing aspects of Lucas is the discus-
sion of pre-existing conditions that may limit a landowner's
right to compensation. Specifically, Lucas explained that tak-
ings claims must be analyzed in light of the particular estate
and corresponding rights that the owner possesses.1'0 Accord-
ingly, where the owner's title is itself limited by background
principles of property law that otherwise preclude the owner
from engaging in a particular use, such use can be prohibited
by a government without providing compensation, even though
the owner is left without alternative economic uses. Thus,
compensation is not due when there is a "pre-existing limita-
tion upon the landowner's title"'61 that would prevent the
owner from engaging in the proposed use. Lucas explained
that such pre-existing limitations "must inhere in the title
itself" and cannot be newly legislated or decreed.162 For exam-
ple, common law nuisance principles preclude one owner from
using property in a manner that causes flooding of a neighbor's
property.163 Because a common law nuisance action by the
neighbor could successfully enjoin the flooding activity, a regu-
lation that achieves the same result would not cause a taking
even though alternative uses might not be available. There-
fore, no property right is taken because the regulatory restric-
tion merely restates or duplicates an applicable pre-existing
limitation.
The problem is determining whether a pre-existing limita-
tion applies.' Lucas offers only two examples of when back-
160. I&
161. Id. at 2900.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. In an effort to clarify, Justice Scalia provides an example of a pre-existing
limitation that inheres in the title itself. See Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900. The example
compares Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900), with Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
444 U.S. 162 (1979). In Scranton, a riparian property owner held title subject to a pre-
existing navigational servitude in favor of the government. Scranton, 179 U.S. at 156.
Scranton, therefore, holds that the assertion of the servitude by government was not a
taking. Id at 165. In contrast, Kaiser Aetna demonstrates that if a navigational
servitude is asserted where the private title was not subject to such a pre-existing
limitation, the imposition will be a taking. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 178-80. The Lucas
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ground principles of state property law might limit the owner's
inherent rights and thereby preclude compensation. The first
is when the government restricts uses that could be precluded
under principles of common law nuisance. The second is the
"public necessity" or "public emergency" doctrine.
a. Common Law Nuisance
Lucas recognizes that an owner does not have an unre-
strained right to use property in a manner that constitutes a
nuisance. Typically, nuisance is defined as conduct that unrea-
sonably interferes with the private use and enjoyment of prop-
erty.16 5 What qualifies as an unreasonable interference
depends on the circumstances of the particular case.' The
factors considered include (1) the degree of harm to other
lands that would result from the proposed activity, (2) the
social value of the activity and its suitability to the locality, and
(3) the relative ease by which the harm can be avoided.167
Lucas states that courts must rely on these principles of com-
mon law to determine whether a particular use is an unreason-
able interference with neighboring property."6
Several factors in Lucas suggest that these common law
nuisance principles will only rarely have a bearing on the com-
pensation question. The first factor is that at the threshold
level, the proscribed use must be sufficiently unreasonable that
an adjoining owner could have successfully maintained a nui-
sance action to enjoin the activity. Thus, the mere imposition
of an external effect on adjacent properties does not necessar-
ily translate into an unreasonable interference and a nuisance.
As recognized in Lucas, "[p]ractically all human activities ...
interfere to some extent with others or involve some risk of
interference." 169 What must be shown is that the activity is
unreasonable under the common law principles. The govern-
ment regulation acts as a substitute for the private nuisance
action and may do "no more than duplicate the result that
Court points out that "similar treatment must be accorded confiscatory regulations."
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900.
165. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826 (1977).
166. 1& § 826 cmt. b.
167. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901; see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826, cmts. b
& c (1977).
168. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2901. The Court specifically directed attention to the
factors identified in the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS for guidance in this
determination. Id. at 2901.
169. Id. at 2898 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 cmt. g (1977)).
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could have been achieved in the courts" by adjacent
landowners. 170
The Lucas Court cautioned lower courts on this issue:
"We stress that an affirmative decree eliminating all economi-
cally beneficial uses may be defended only if an objectively rea-
sonable application of relevant precedents would exclude
those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the land is
presently found."'' By directing lower courts to apply prece-
dent objectively and reasonably, the Court implied that it
anticipates that some lower courts may be tempted to apply
broadly and unreasonably common law nuisance principles to
avoid government liability for takings.
A second narrowing factor is the Court's placement of the
burden on the government to show that a pre-existing limita-
tion applies. In directing a remand to the state courts, Lucas
explained that the state must identify background principles of
nuisance and property law that prohibit the use intended for
the property. 172 On remand, the state failed to meet this
burden.
The third limiting factor is that a legislature cannot simply
label an activity a nuisance and thereby avoid compensation.
Legislative findings of a nuisance cannot circumvent the duty
of a court to determine whether, under common law princi-
ples, a particular prohibited action constitutes a nuisance.
Lucas teaches that a legislative characterization of a use as
"noxious," or a regulation as "harm preventing," does not
determine the takings question.173 Similarly, a legislative char-
acterization of a use as a "nuisance" cannot automatically pre-
clude compensation. 74
Finally, the Supreme Court stated that the nuisance
exception applies narrowly. In Lucas, the Court pointed out
that common law principles "rarely support prohibition of the
'essential use' of land."'1 75 Two examples identified in Lucas
illustrate such rare situations. First, the Court explained that
an owner would not be entitled to compensation if a govern-
ment precluded filling in a private lake where the displaced
170. 1d at 2900.
171. Id at 2902 n.18 (emphasis in original).
172. Id. at 2901-02.
173. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2899.
174. Id. at 2898 n.12.
175. Id. at 2901 (citing Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78, 86 (1911)).
12891993]
1290 University of Puget Sound Law Review [Vol. 16:1259
water would flood neighboring land.176 Second, the Court indi-
cated that compensation would not be available if government
prohibits construction of a nuclear generating plant on an
earthquake fault line. In contrast, in a more common situa-
tion, such as in Lucas, where the owner simply wanted to build
a home, the Court opined that it was "unlikely" that common
law principles would prevent construction.177 Not surprisingly,
the South Carolina Supreme Court has now ruled that there
are no pre-existing limitations inherent in Lucas' property
rights that would preclude building a home on his property. 78
Decisions of several lower courts recognize that this nui-
sance rationale has fairly limited applicability. Activities such
as limestone mining, underground coal mining, stripmining,
and filling of wetlands have all been held not to be nui-
sances. 79 Although predating the Lucas decision, these results
illustrate the relatively narrow application of a nuisance justi-
fication for extinguishing, without compensation, all economic
use of property.
b. Public Necessity/Emergency Cases
The second limitation inherent in an owner's title, arising
out of background principles of property law, involves the pub-
lic necessity/emergency doctrine 80 The common law has long
held that government may, with immunity, physically destroy
private property in certain situations to avert an immediate
danger.'' For example, structures in the path of a conflagra-
tion may be razed to create a firebreak without triggering the
176. Id. at 2900.
177. Id. at 2901.
178. Lucas v. Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 424 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1992) (order on
remand). Thus, Lucas is entitled to damages for a temporary taking, and, if permits to
build are not issued, the taking will become permanent and additional damages will be
required. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987).
179. See, e.g., Whitney Benefits v. United States, 926 F.2d 1169, 1177 (Fed. Cir.),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 406 (1991) (holding that mining is not a noncompensable
nuisance); Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 166-67 (1990)
(holding that limestone quarries in a wetland are not a noncompensable nuisance);
Western Energy Co. v. Genie Land Co., 737 P.2d 478, 482 (Mont. 1987) (holding that
strip mining of coal in Montana is not within any nuisance exception).
180. This doctrine refers to "litigation absolving the State (or private parties) of
liability for the destruction of 'real and personal property, in cases of actual necessity,
to prevent the spreading of fire' or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and
property of others." Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2900 n.16 (citing Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S.
16, 18-19 (1880); United States v. Pacific RR, 120 U.S. 227, 238-39 (1887)).
181. United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952).
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compensation requirement l Other typical cases involve dis-
eased plants, fruit, or animals that are destroyed so that the
disease is prevented from spreading and wiping out healthy
stocks or endangering public health." s
The basis for denying compensation in public necessity/
emergency cases comes from the ancient prerogative powers of
the English crown that could be exercised without compensa-
tion. 8 4 Unlike most of the king's prerogatives, which were
integrated into the power of eminent domain, the emergency
power has survived as a separate institution.
The power to raze houses in a conflagration was historically
one of the long list of ancient prerogative powers of the Eng-
lish Crown which, like most of the prerogatives, the crown
could exercise without compensation. Most of the preroga-
tives have disappeared .... The emergency power, however,
has survived not so much as an exception to the normal rule
of compensation but as the survivor of an older
institution.185
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has observed that a denial of
compensation in this unique category of cases is based "as
much upon tradition as upon principle."' 8
Although often incorrectly referred to as a regulatory tak-
ing case, Miller v. Schoene '87 is a public necessity case. Miller
involved the purposeful destruction of ornamental cedar trees
in response to the threat of a disease spreading to valuable
apple orchards in the area. As in other public necessity cases,
the state was forced to destroy the cedar trees to avert an even
182. See Bowditch v. Boston, 101 U.S. 16 (1880).
183. See generally Annotation, Owner's Right Under Fifth or Fouteenth
Amendment to be Compensated for Property Destroyed by Public Authorities-
Supreme Court Cases, 97 L. Ed. 164 (1953). This line of authority was also followed by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149 (1952), where
compensation was denied when an oil terminal was destroyed by the United States
military so as to prevent the facility from falling to the advantage of the invading
enemy. See also United States v. Pacific Railroad Co., 120 U.S. 227, 234 (1887) (denying
compensation for destruction of bridges during civil war); HENRY E. MILLS ON THE
LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 3 (2d ed. 1888) (preventing property from falling into the
hands of the enemy is not compensable).
184. Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1067 (1982); Bowditch, 101 U.S. at 18-19.
185. Stoebuck, supra note 16, at 1067.
186. Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 415-16 (citing Bowditch, 101 U.S. 16 (1879);
Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502 (1923)).
187. 276 U.S. 272 (1927).
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greater area-wide destruction of private property.'"
Obviously, tradition and ancient prerogatives of the Eng-
lish crown provide little basis for any further extension of this
unusual exception to the compensation requirement. Rather,
recent cases illustrate that courts will closely review whether
an actual emergency necessitates the destruction of private
property to avert an impending peril, and if the justification is
lacking, compensation will be required for the lost property. 8 9
III. WASHINGTON STATE LAW IN THE POST-LUCAS ERA
Since 1987, perhaps no state supreme court has struggled
with takings law like the Washington Supreme Court. To its
credit, the Washington court has recognized the doctrinal blur-
ring and tensions in federal takings law that existed prior to
Lucas.'-9 However, in responding to the difficulties presented
by previously unresolved inconsistencies between Mugler and
Pennsylvania Coal, the Washington court developed a unique
approach to takings law. Most significantly, Washington's
"threshold inquiry," which automatically screens out many
takings challenges, is inconsistent with Lucas and should be
abandoned.' 91
A. The Threshold Inquiry: Preventing Harm Rationale
Washington's recent struggle with federal takings prece-
dent begins primarily with the 1987 decision in Orion Corp. v.
State."2 In Orion, the state supreme court recognized the con-
flict between Pennsylvania Coal and Mugler. 93 The Washing-
ton court, however, interpreted Keystone and Mugler to
188. The Court explained that physical destruction of the cedar trees was not a
taking because
the state was under the necessity of making a choice between the preservation
of one class of property and that of the other.... When forced to such a
choice the state does not exceed its constitutional powers by deciding upon the
destruction of one class of property in order to save another.
Id at 279.
189. Yancy v. United States, 915 F.2d 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Department of
Agriculture and Consumer Services v. Mid-Florida Growers, Inc., 521 So. 2d 101 (Fla.),
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 870 (1988).
190. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 645-48, 747 P.2d 1062, 1075-77
(1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
191. See Presbytery of Seattle v. King County, 114 Wash. 2d 320, 329, 787 P.2d 907,
912, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
192. 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
193. Id. at 645-46, 747 P.2d at 1075-76.
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insulate from compensation regulations that prevent public
harms:
As we read the Keystone Coal Ass'n opinion, exercises of the
police power cannot be characterized as a compensable tak-
ing whenever the state imposes land use restrictions in order
to safeguard the "public interest in health, the environment,
and the fiscal integrity of the area." This insulation from
the takings analysis continues, even if the regulation denies
a landowner all economically viable use of the property.
194
This analysis was further refined in Presbytery of Seattle
v. King County.19 5 Under Presbytery, the reviewing court
applies a "threshold inquiry" to determine whether the regula-
tion is susceptible to a takings analysis. If the regulation may
be characterized as preventing harm to the public interest in
health, safety, the environment, or the fiscal integrity of the
area, and does not destroy a fundamental attribute of owner-
ship, the regulation is insulated from the takings analysis.'96
This initial determination considers whether the "predominant
goal of the regulation" is harm prevention rather than confer-
ring a public benefit.'97
In conflict with Presbytery, Lucas holds that the question
of whether a regulation "prevents harm" or "confers a public
benefit" is irrelevant because such characterizations are in the
eye of the beholder. Lucas states that it is "pointless" to make
the takings issue "hang upon this terminology."'98 In contrast
with Presbytery, the Lucas Court concluded that the "noxious-
use logic cannot serve as a touchstone" to determine regulatory
takings."' By eliminating the harm prevention/benefit confer-
ral rationale, Lucas directly undermines the core component of
Washington's threshold inquiry.
A creative attempt to reconcile Presbytery with Lucas was
194. Id. at 654, 747 P.2d at 1080 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). The court
similarly stated:
No compensable taking can occur as long as regulations substantially serve
the legitimate public purpose of prohibiting uses of property injurious to the
public interest in health, the environment, or the fiscal integrity of the
community. At most, such regulations would be subject to invalidation as an
unreasonable burden, violative of substantive due process.
Id. at 657, 747 P.2d at 1081 (emphasis in original).
195. 114 Wash. 2d 320, 787 P.2d 907, cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 284 (1990).
196. Id. at 329-30, 787 P.2d at 912.
197. Id. at 329 n.13, 787 P.2d at 912 n.13.
198. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898 n.11.
199. Id at 2899.
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made by the Washington State Court of Appeals in Powers v.
Skagit County." The court suggested that the effect of Lucas
was to impose a "prethreshold step" on the Presbytery frame-
work.2° ' Specifically, if Powers could show he was entitled to a
categorical taking under Lucas, compensation would be
required. But if the categorical test was not met, the Court of
Appeals would apply the Presbytery threshold inquiry.20 2 Of
course, under the Presbytery inquiry, the challenged building
restrictions would be insulated from Powers' takings claim
because the restrictions were adopted to safeguard the public
interest and health.2
0 3
The obvious problem with Powers is that it does not recon-
cile Lucas and Presbytery. The suggestion that the Lucas cate-
gorical test can be applied first, and then followed by
Presbytery's "harm prevention" inquiry, does nothing to
address the fundamental conflict between Presbytery's "harm
prevention" inquiry and Lucas' rejection of that approach. In
short, the Powers attempt to follow both Presbytery and Lucas
ends up missing a key point of Lucas-that is, the harm pre-
vention rationale of Presbytery simply does not answer the
takings question.
While Washington's threshold inquiry may reflect an
attempt to provide a set of rules for regulators and landowners
to rely on, any certainty comes at the price of screening out
legitimate takings claims and removing the protection of the
Fifth Amendment. Moreover, the approach is directly under-
mined by Lucas. Washington courts should now abandon the
threshold inquiry and realign state precedent with federal law.
B. Fundamental Attributes of Ownership
Assuming that Presbytery's threshold inquiry is aban-
doned, a question arises regarding the validity of the funda-
mental attribute of ownership component of that inquiry.
Specifically, Presbytery allows a taking claim to go forward if
the regulation impairs a fundamental attribute of ownership,
defined as the "right to possess, to exclude others and to dis-
pose of property. ' 2 "
200. 67 Wash. App. 180, 835 P.2d 230 (1992).
201. Id. at 190, 835 P.2d at 236.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 193, 835 P.2d at 237.
204. Presbytery, 114 Wash. 2d at 330, 787 P.2d at 912.
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This aspect of Presbytery works to the detriment of prop-
erty owners because a key attribute of ownership is missing
from the Presbytery list: the right to make reasonable use of
property.
It is uncertain why the right to use property was left off
the Presbytery list, especially because the Washington
Supreme Court has long recognized such a right as fundamen-
tal. In Lange v. State,205 the court stated the following:
We have repeatedly recognized that "property," as used in
the constitutional phrase, encompasses many rights ..... "The
substantial value of property lies in its use. If the right of
use be denied, the value of the property is annihilated and
ownership is rendered a barren right." Article I, section 16
was intended to protect all the essential elements of owner-
ship which make property valuable. "Ownership" in prop-
erty has long been conceived as a "complex of rights"
including the right [of] use.206
Once it is recognized that the right of use is itself a funda-
mental attribute of ownership, there is no longer any point in
asking, as a threshold inquiry, whether a land use regulation
impairs a fundamental attribute of ownership. Virtually all
land use restrictions infringe on the right of use and thereby
trigger a potential taking. Of course, often the degree of inter-
ference with the owner's right of use will not be sufficient to
result in a taking. But each land use restriction is open to
review under the takings analysis to determine whether the
impairment of use goes too far and unfairly shifts the burden
of achieving public objectives to individuals.20 7
205. 86 Wash. 2d 585, 547 P.2d 282 (1976).
206. Id. at 590, 547 P.2d at 285 (quoting Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wash. 2d
400, 409, 348 P.2d 664, 669 (1960)) (citations omitted). See also Nollan v. California
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833-34 n.2 (1987) (stating that "the right to build on
one's own property-even though its exercise can be subjected to legitimate permitting
requirements--cannot remotely be described as a 'governmental benefit' "); United
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1944) (stating that the term
"property" includes the right to possess, use and dispose of it; constitutional provision
addesses every sort of interest in property).
207. After this article went to print, the Washington Supreme Court issued its
decision in Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 586, 854 P.2d 1 (1993). The Guimont
decision now recognizes that the "holding in Lucas requires a reordering of the
Presbytery threshold analysis." Id. at 598, 854 P.2d at 8. Guimont revises the analysis
so that the first question asked is whether the land use restriction impairs a
fundamental attribute of ownership. Id. at 599-601, 854 P.2d at 8-9. Significantly,
Guimont now recognizes that "[iln light of Lucas" the fundamental attributes of
ownership include the "right to make some economically viable use of the property."
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C. The Substantial Advancment Test
A third issue in Washington takings law concerns the
application of the Agins substantial advancement test 2°8 when
reviewing the constitutionality of development fees and exac-
tions. The leading case is Nollan v. California Coastal Com-
mission,2°9 in which the Supreme Court applied the substantial
advancement test to review whether an exaction, or permit
condition, is a legitimate exercise of regulatory power.210 At
issue was the California Coastal Commission's demand that, as
a condition to rebuilding their beachfront home, the Nollans
would have to give up one-third of their property for a public
access easement.211  The Supreme Court recognized that pro-
viding public access was a legitimate goal. However, the prob-
lem was the Commission's means of acquiring the easement. 12
Because the Nollans' proposed house did not impair any
existing rights of public access, the easement requirement was
unrelated to mitigating any adverse impacts caused by the
project. Accordingly, the exaction was not a legitimate land
use regulation, 213 but was simply a means of "extorting" public
benefits from the Nollans through a leveraging of the permit-
Id. at 602, 854 P.2d at 10 (emphasis in original). Accordingly, regardless of the public
purposes for a land use restriction, Guimont correctly recognizes that a taking must be
found, and compensation provided, where the land use restriction destroys all
economically viable use of property.
The Washington Supreme Court, however, did not complete the task of revising
Presbytery. The court recognized that the other half of Presbytery's threshold
inquiry--asking whether the regulation can be characterized as harm preventing
rather than benefit conferring-may yet be undermined by Lucas. Id. at 604 n.5, 854
P.2d at 11 n.5. However, the court determined that it was not necessary to go further
in dismantling Presbytery in the Guimont decision. Id. Accordingly, finishing the task
of bringing Washington law into conformity with United States Surpeme Court
precedent will require further litigation.
208. See supra part II.B.4.
209. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
210. Id. at 834-35 n.3.
211. Id. at 827.
212. lI at 834-35.
213. Id, at 838-39. Specifically, the Court stated:
It is quite impossible to understand how a requirement that people already on
the public beaches be able to walk across the Nollans' property reduces any
obstacles to viewing the beach created by the new house. It is also impossible
to understand how it lowers any "psychological barrier" to using public
beaches, or how it helps to remedy any additional congestion on them caused
by construction of the Nollans' new house. We therefore find that the
Commission's imposition of the permit condition cannot be treated as an
exercise of its land-use power for any of these purposes.
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ting authority, and thus it was a taking without
compensation.214
In an analagous situation, permit applicants in Sintra, Inc.
v. Seattle215 and Robinson v. Seattle,16 were also subject to
exactions imposed as conditions to issuance of development
permits. At issue in both cases was a Seattle ordinance which
required that property owners, as a condition to converting
low-income housing units to another use, either build replace-
ment units or pay a substantial fee to the city's low-income
housing program.217 While providing low-income housing may
be a legitimate objective of government, the question, as in
Nollan, was whether the means of acquiring such public bene-
fits was constitutional.
The Washington State Supreme Court in Robinson deter-
mined that Seattle's low-income housing problem was not
caused by the individual property owners who applied for rede-
velopment permits, but was the result of social forces within
the city as a whole.218 The court explained that requiring per-
mit applicants to pay a fee to a city housing fund was an unfair
shifting of social burdens onto a discrete segment of the com-
munity.219 In effect, the property owners were being asked to
remedy a public problem that was not of their making. Like-
wise, in Sintra the court explained that the regulation went
beyond preventing harm and required the additional improper
step of providing housing. "[Tlhis burden was unfairly allo-
cated to individual property owners, rather than equally dis-
tributed among all citizens.""22 As the court succinctly stated
in San Telmo Associates v. Seattle,221 "Quite simply, the munic-
ipal body cannot shift the social costs of development on to a
214. Id, at 837.
215. 119 Wash. 2d 1, 829 P.2d 765, cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
216. 119 Wash. 2d 34, 830 P.2d 318, cert denied, 113 S. Ct. 676 (1992).
217. Id. at 43, 830 P.2d at 324-25.
218. Id. at 55, 830 P.2d at 331.
219. In so finding, the court stated:
MTihe City may not constitutionally pass on the social costs of the development
of the downtown area to current owners of low income housing. The problem
must be shared by the entire city, and those who plan to develop their
property from low income housing to other uses cannot be penalized by being
required to provide more housing.
Id. at 53, 830 P.2d at 330 (quoting San Telmo Assoc. v. Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 25, 735
P.2d 673, 675 (1987)).
220. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 15-16, 829 P.2d at 773.
221. 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
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developer under the guise of regulation."222
Significantly, this analysis in Sintra and Robinson paral-
lels the concerns expressed in Nollan. Singling out the Nol-
lans to remedy a public problem, "although they had not
contributed to it more than other coastal landowners,
223
would violate the purpose of the Takings Clause in barring
government from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens that ought to be borne by the public as a whole.224 In the
same manner, in Sintra and Robinson, providing low-income
housing was a proper objective for government to pursue-the
problem was the lack of legitimate regulatory justification for
imposing the remedy on landowners. Under Nollan, using the
permitting authority to shift such social costs is a taking.
Although Sintra and Robinson have been applauded for
concluding that the low-income housing fee violates due pro-
cess, both decisions contain analysis that is of concern. Specifi-
cally, despite what should have been a clear application of
Nollan, the Robinson decision held that there was no facial
taking because the property owners were not denied all use of
the property.2 ' The problem with this analysis is that it
ignores the Nollan basis for a taking. The United States
Supreme Court has stated that whether there has been a
denial of all economic use is irrelevant to the substantial
advancement test applied in Nollan. For example, in Nollan,
the owners were not denied all use of their land;226 the Nollans
received their permit. But this had no effect on the analysis of
the impropriety of the condition attached to the permit. Like-
wise, in Yee v. Escondido,2 the Court stated that whether a
regulation meets the substantially advance test "does not
depend on the extent to which petitioners are deprived of the
economic use of their particular pieces of property .... ,,228 Jus-
tice Scalia has similarly explained that the degree of economic
impairment is "irrelevant" and "will in no way assist this
inquiry" where a regulation is challenged under the substantial
advancement test.229 Accordingly, Robinson mistakenly over-
222. Id at 24, 735 P.2d at 675.
223. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 n.4.
224. Id. at 835-36 n.4, (citing Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
225. Robinson, 119 Wash. 2d at 53-54, 830 P.2d at 330.
226. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 830.
227. 112 S. Ct. 1522 (1992).
228. Id. at 1532.
229. Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 19 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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looks a clear basis for finding the development fee exactions
unconstitutional under the Takings Clause.
A related misanalysis of Nollan is present in Sintra. In
that case, the Washington court stated that the housing fee did
not present a Nollan case "because no physical invasion has
been affected" by the ordinance.2s Sintra thus wrongly inter-
preted Nollan's nexus analysis as being limited to cases where
the demanded condition involves some physical invasion onto
property.
This characterization of Nollan as merely a physical inva-
sion case is unfounded. The Supreme Court decision in Yee,
issued six weeks prior to Sintra, expressly rejected the notion
that Nollan was a physical invasion case or that its principles
were limited to a physical invasion context. In Yee, the prop-
erty owners attempted to characterize a rent control provision
as working a physical invasion taking.23 1 The Supreme Court
explained that the rent control provision did not result in a
taking by physical occupation, but instead suggested that the
ordinance should have been analyzed as a potential regulatory
taking.3 2 Citing Nollan, the Court explained that the rent
control ordinance may cause "a regulatory taking" depending
on "whether there is a sufficient nexus between the effect of
the ordinance and the objectives it is supposed to advance.
'"23
This inquiry under Nollan "has nothing to do with whether
the ordinance causes a physical taking.
' 2 3
While the exaction in Nollan involved a physical easement
in land, Yee is clear that Nollan's nexus analysis is based on
constitutional principles that do not change simply because the
government demands money rather than land. For example, if
the coastal commission had demanded that the Nollans pay
$10,000 to the public treasury rather than give up an easement,
the unconstitutionality of imposing such an unrelated condi-
tion would not have been any different.235 The only difference
is that the commission's "plan of extortion 236 would have
230. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 17 n.7, 829 P.2d at 773 n.7.
231. Yee, 112 S. Ct. at 1526-27.
232. Id at 1528.
233. Id. at 1530 (emphasis in original).
234. Id. (emphasis in original).
235. As illustrated in Nollan, the same principle precludes government from
forbidding people from shouting fire in a crowded theater while also granting
dispensations to those willing to contribute $100 to the public treasury. Nollan, 483
U.S. at 837.
236. Id. at 837.
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yielded money instead of property. That difference, however,
cannot transform the illegal leveraging of the permitting
authority into a legal leveraging. Similarly, Nollan applies to
Sintra and Robinson even though money was the subject of
the exactions. In every case, the controlling question must be
whether the condition imposed on the property owner is a
legitimate mitigation of a substantial adverse impact actually
caused by the proposed development. If not, the condition is
unconstitutional.
The Washington State Supreme Court should be
applauded for its sensitivity to the practical need for a "body of
cogent, workable rules upon which regulators and landowners
alike can rely. ... "23 However, to be cogent and workable,
those rules must be consistent with federal precedent. The
challenge ahead will be for Washington courts to recognize
where the problems lie in its prior cases and to correct those
misinterpretations. The sooner this is complete, the better.
IV. TAKINGS IMPLICATIONS OF THE GROWTH
MANAGEMENT ACT
Having set forth the regulatory takings doctrine and the
modern analytical framework as established by recent
Supreme Court decisions, most notably Lucas, attention may
now turn to an analysis of potential takings resulting from
Washington's Growth Management Act.
The primary focus of the GMA is to require each city and
countym to prepare a new comprehensive plan and develop-
ment regulations to guide the orderly growth of the commu-
nity.139 The new plan will be composed of various elements
including a land use element, housing element, capital facilities
element, utilities element, transportation element, and a rural
element for counties.240 The plan must be internally consistent
and be coordinated and consistent with the plans of adjoining
communities.24' Consistency is also required for the develop-
237. Sintra, 119 Wash. 2d at 5, 829 P.2d at 768.
238. See WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.040 (West 1991) (criteria for determining
whether a particular county or city is required to plan pursuant to the process
established by the GMA).
239. I& § 36.70A.040(1). A comprehensive plan generally consists of maps and
descriptive text covering objectives, principles, and standards used to develop the local
planning policies embodied in the plan. Id. § 36.70A.070.
240. Id. § 36.70A.070(1)-(6).
241. Id, § 36.70A.070.
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ment regulations that will implement the plan.24
While claims alleging that the mere enactment of a law
results in a taking can sometimes be successful, pursuing such
"facial" takings claims is generally an uphill battle.243 This
will likely be true for most aspects of the GMA. Because of
the flexibility built into the GMA and the discretion left with
local government, potential takings liability will depend on
how the GMA policies are applied to a specific parcel. Accord-
ingly, the takings implications of the GMA will necessarily
depend on the facts of each particular case. A thorough analy-
sis of the various regulatory takings tests should be conducted
to evaluate whether, in the particular case at hand, a taking
claim should be pursued. What follows is a general overview
of several broad aspects of the GMA that, depending on the
application to particular parcels, are likely to raise potential
takings.
A. Urban Growth Boundaries
One of the most significant features of the GMA is the
requirement that counties adopt "urban growth areas.
' ' 44
Based on population growth projections, the urban growth
areas must designate densities sufficient to accommodate pro-
jected growth over the next twenty years.245 Cities are auto-
matically within each county's urban growth area.246 The
purpose of these designations is to concentrate growth within
the area and to discourage growth outside the area in order to
avoid urban sprawl.247
The general requirement that urban growth areas be
established does not in itself raise any particular taking ques-
tion. Zoning property for particular purposes has been a com-
242. Id. § 36.70A.120. The consistency requirement is a major policy change from
Washington law, which previously had no requirement that zoning regulations be
consistent with the comprehensive plan. The effect will be to significantly enhance
the role of the comprehensive plan in guiding development and growth in Washington.
See, e.g., DeBottari v. City Council of the Norco, 217 Cal, Rptr. 790, 795 (Cal. Ct. App.
1985) (stating that consistency requirement between comprehensive general plan and
zoning regulations is the "linchpin of California's land use and development laws; it is
the principle which infused the concept of planned growth with the force of law"); see
also Lesher Communications, Inc. v. Walnut Creek, 802 P.2d 317 (Cal. 1990).
243. See, e.g., Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988).
244. WASH. REV. CoDE ANN. § 36.70A.110 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
245. I& § 36.70A.110(2).
246. Id. § 36.70A.110(1).
247. Id. § 36.70A.110(3).
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mon land use practice for many years. One may view the
growth area requirement as simply another type of zoning
comprised of two large overlay zones: the urban growth area
and everything else. Accordingly, the takings implications of
the urban growth area designations are no different than zon-
ing generally.
Typically, a zoning designation will meet the Agins
requirement that the regulation substantially advance legiti-
mate state interests.248 In other words, in most instances the
setting of urban growth boundaries will be a legitimate exer-
cise of the police power. The more likely potential taking is
where the impact of the urban growth designation "goes too
far" in its degree of interference with the economic use of par-
ticular parcels. For example, the GMA specifies that develop-
ment can occur outside the urban boundary only if the
development is "not urban in nature. ' 249 Accordingly, prop-
erty that is located outside a designated urban growth area will
have restricted development potential. Under the new restric-
tions, if a particular parcel is denied all economically viable
use, a taking will be categorically established under Lucas.
Similarly, even if all use is not precluded, a taking may
occur where the setting of a growth boundary undermines rea-
sonable investment-backed expectations of the property
owner.21 For instance, it is possible that property outside the
urban growth area may have previously been zoned for fairly
intensive development. A property owner who invested in
such property relying on the intensive zoning may be able to
successfully claim that the redesignation outside the urban
growth boundary frustrates reasonable investment-backed
expectations. A cautious local government may choose to avoid
this potential problem by setting the urban growth boundary
line to include all land currently zoned for intensive
development.
Takings liability may also occur where the drawing of
urban growth boundaries causes a particular parcel to suffer a
significant diminution in value.25' Under the ac hoc takings
test,252 a taking may be found when the economic impact on
the claimant leads to the conclusion that the urban growth
248. See supra part II.B.4.
249. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.110(1) (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
250. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8; see discussion supra part II.B.2.
251. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895 n.8.
252. See discussion supra part II.B.3.
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boundary unfairly places the economic burden on a few prop-
erty owners rather than on the community as a whole. Of
course, the creation of the boundary itself will cause dramatic
differences between the value of undeveloped property inside
the boundary and the value of similar property outside, regard-
less where the boundaries of the urban growth area are
located. For instance, those on the inside can rest assured that
the supply of developable land is now artificially limited, and
hence more valuable. Those on the outside will be prohibited
from entering the market. This type of government line-draw-
ing is marked by discretion and political fervor combined with
substantial economic impacts on those who are excluded from
the urban area, and it may result in situations in which a court
would conclude that the economic burden of the new regula-
tion should be borne by society as a whole.5 3
Whether the designation of urban growth boundaries will
cause a taking of property that lies outside the boundary will
also depend on how the GMA provisions are interpreted. For
example, the GMA provides room for flexibility by allowing
development outside the urban growth area if the development
is not characterized as urban. Indeed, the definition of "urban
growth" is quite limited and may allow for a reasonable degree
of development outside the urban boundary.2 4  The term
urban growth refers only to development that is "intensive"
enough to be incompatible with the primary use of land for
agricultural and mineral resources.255 This definition could
provide the flexibility needed to avoid many takings pitfalls if
it is utilized to allow various less intensive but still economi-
253. The economic disparities caused by the line drawing can be reduced if a large
supply of developable land is included within the urban growth area. Drawing the line
to provide a large supply of developable land reduces the government's interference
with the market by articially reducing the supply. The smaller the urban growth area,
the smaller the supply of developable land, and the greater the disparity in land values
driven by the line drawing.
254. The GMA defines "urban growth" as follows:
"Urban growth" refers to growth that makes intensive use of land for the
location of buildings, structures, and impermeable surfaces to such a degree as
to be incompatible with the primary use of such land for the production of
food, other agricultural products, or fiber, or the extraction of mineral
resources. When allowed to spread over wide areas, urban growth typically
requires urban governmental services. "Characterized by urban growth"
refers to land having urban growth located on it, or to land located in
relationship to an area with urban growth on it as to be appropriate for urban
growth.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.030(14) (West 1991).
255. 1&
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cally viable and beneficial uses of property.2-
B. Resource Areas
The GMA requires a local government to identify resource
lands within its jurisdiction2 7 and to impose development reg-
ulations on them.'5 "Resource lands" are defined as agricul-
tural lands,' 9 forest lands,260 and mineral resource lands.26 '
As with much of the GMA, there is little detail as to what local
government must do to satisfy the requirement of adopting
development regulations for resource lands. The GMA simply
requires that regulations must "assure the conservation of agri-
cultural, forest, and mineral resource land" so designated. 6 2
The main purpose appears to be to protect the long-term com-
mercial use of these lands.
263
The most probable takings implication involving resource
lands stems from the actual designation of such lands. Local
government should be careful to designate each parcel of
resource land under the standard set forth in the GMA. That
is, an area may be designated and conserved as a resource land
only if the land has long-term commercial significance for agri-
culture, forest, or mineral use. The temptation, however, may
be to paint large areas with a broad brush and thus make less
precise classifications regarding each parcel of land. Because a
planner's vision may overlook the natural characteristics of a
256. For example, the addition of a small number of homes on the family farm
could be viewed as not being urban growth and thus could be an approved
development even though the property lies outside the urban growth area.
257. Id. § 36.70A.170 (West 1991).
258. Id, § 36.70A.060 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993). Forest and agricultural land
within urban growth areas may not be designated as resource areas unless a program
for transfer of development rights is in place. I&i § 36.70A.060(4). The legislature also
provided for the Department of Community Development to adopt guidelines for
classifying resource lands. Id § 36.70A.050 (West 1991).
259. Id. § 36.70A.030(2).
260. Id § 36.70A.030(8).
261. Id. § 36.70A.030(11).
262. Id. § 36.70A.060(1) (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
263. For instance, the GMA states as follows:
Such regulations shall assure that the use of lands adjacent to agricultural,
forest, or mineral resource lands shall not interfere with the continued use, in
the accustomed manner in accordance with best management practices, of
these designated land for production of food, agricultural products, or timber,
or for the extraction of minerals.
Id. Similarly, the amendments to the GMA require notice to adjoining lands that a
"variety of commercial activities may occur that are not compatible with residential
development for certain periods of limited duration." Id,
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particular parcel, or other factors such as size, historical use, or
proximity to logical growth areas, some parcels may be inap-
propriately designated. This would create a takings risk if the
resource designation is not a commercially viable use, yet it
becomes locked into such use by the GMA designation.' 4
The best approach to avoid this potential takings liability,
and the approach mandated by the GMA, is to make sure that
every individual parcel designated as resource land meets the
required standard of long-term commercial significance. Long-
term commercial significance includes "the growing capacity,
productivity, and soil composition of the land for long-term
commercial production, in consideration with the lands's prox-
imity to population areas, and the possibility of more intense
uses of the land.""z  In other words, properly designated
resource land must, by definition, have long-term commercial
viability and thus, in most instances, will not be taken by den-
ing all economically viable use.
The Department of Community Development (DCD)
guidelines spell out factors to be considered for determining
whether agricultural land should be allowed a more intensive
use.2" These factors, if applied to permit other uses of agricul-
tural land, may allow local government to avoid takings claims.
By giving local government flexibility to allow other uses
when it makes no economic sense to continue the agricultural
use, the guidelines provide local government with an option
that can avoid many of the potential takings problems.267 It
264. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894. See discussion supra part II.B.2.
265. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.030(10) (1991) (emphasis added).
266. These factors are as follows:
(a) The availability of public facilities;
(b) Tax status;
(c) The availability of public services;
(d) Relationship or proximity to urban growth areas;
(e) Predominant parcel size;
(f) Land use settlement patterns and their compatibility with agricultural
practices;
(g) Intensity of nearby land uses;
(h) History of land development permits nearby;
(i) Land values under alternative uses; and
(j) Proximity of markets.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-190-050(1) (Supp. 1991).
267. Similar policies are evident in regulation of forest and mineral resource
lands. For instance, one factor is "[t]he proximity of forest land to urban and suburban
areas and rural settlements: Forest lands of long-term commercial significance are
located outside the urban and suburban areas and rural settlements." Id. § 365-190-
060(2). This recognizes that forest land that is near "rural settlements" may not be
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will be up to local government, however, to take advantage of
this flexibility to allow property owners reasonable use of their
land.
C. Critical Areas
As with natural resource lands, the GMA requires that
critical areas be designated.2' 6 And, as with natural resource
regulations, the takings implications of critical area regulations
depend on how the regulations are actually applied. The
greater the severity and more dramatic the impact on the pri-
vate property owner, the greater the risk a taking will occur.
The GMA refers to five types of critical areas: wetlands,2 6 9
areas with a critical recharging effect on aquifers used for pota-
ble water,"0 fish and wildlife habitat conservation areas, 7' fre-
quently flooded areas,2 7 2 and geologically hazardous areas.27 3
The GMA merely requires that each county and city "adopt
development regulations that protect critical areas.Y2 7 4
As with all takings implications of the GMA, it is difficult
to tell whether property will be taken until development regu-
lations are adopted and applied to individual parcels. More-
over, the DCD Minimum Guidelines275 have several elements
that reinforce property rights and avoid unnecessary takings.27 6
suitable for limiting the property to forest use. Another factor is "ftihe size of the
parcels: Forest lands consist of predominantly large parcels." Id. § 365-190-060(3). By
taking into account the economic fact of life that small forest lands are less likely to
have an economically viable use if limited to growing trees, the guidelines protect local
government from taking small forest lands by restricting their use to forest uses when
such use is economically infeasible due to the small size of the parcel. By excluding
from the resource designations those lands that may be used for agricultural purpose,
but without long-term commercial significance, the legislature has protected local
government from taking property.
268. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.170(d) (West 1991).
269. Id § 36.70A.030(17) (defining wetlands). This provision provides limited
protection to property owners who have intentionally created wetlands.
270. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-190-080(2) (Supp. 1991) (providing guidelines for
determining aquifer recharging areas).
271. Id § 365-190-080(5) (establishing fish and wildlife habitat conservation area
guidelines).
272. Id § 365-190-080(3) (establishing frequently flooded area guidelines).
273. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.030(9) (West 1991) (defining geologically
hazardous areas). The DCD Minimum Guidelines provide further help in delineating
these areas. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-190-080(4) (Supp. 1991).
274. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.060 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993).
275. See WAH. ADMIN. CODE ch. 365-190 (Supp. 1991).
276. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.020(6) (West 1991) ("Private property
shall not be taken for public use without just compenstion having been made. The
property rights of landowners shall be protected from arbitrary and discriminatory
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Although the force of the Minimum Guidelines is unclear, 277
its purpose statement provides that "[p]recluding incompatible
uses and development does not mean a prohibition of all uses
or development. Rather, it means governing changes in land
uses, new activities, or development that could adversely affect
critical areas.1
2 78
Accordingly, protecting critical areas does not require
prohibiting all uses or development. However, if local govern-
ments adopt strict development regulations for critical areas
that block all viable economic uses, or substantially diminish
property values, or interfere with reasonable investment-
backed expectations, the agency will be exposed to potential
actions."). Id § 36.70A.370 (West Supp. 1993) (providing for the Attorney General to
establish a process by which local government and state agencies can evaluate the
takings implications of their decisions). In addition, although a private party may not
seek judicial review to compel compliance under RCW § 36.70A,370, a failure to follow
the Attorney General's process may constitute a basis for relief under the
Administrative Procedure Act. See id. §§ 36.70A.370(4), 34.05.570(3)(c).
As to federal agencies, Executive Order 12,630 requires a takings implication
assessment to be conducted before federal regulations are promulgated, but the order
expressly states that the required procedures do not "create any right or benefit,
substantive or procedural, enforceable at law by a party against the United States, its
agencies, its officers, or any person." Exec. Order No. 12,630 § 6, 53 C.F.R. 859 (1988).
However, the federal government has recognized the following.
[N]otwithstanding Section 6 of the Executive Order, the individual takings
analysis or other document developed by a department or agency pursuant to
applicable quidelines would be part of the administrative record and would,
in accordance with generally applicable principles of adminstrative review, be
considered by a reviewing court in deciding whether agency action complies
with the requirement of other applicable statutes, including the
Administrative Procedure Act.
Letter from Richard B. Stewart, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural
Resources Division, to Senator Steve Symms (Oct. 1, 1990)(on file with authors).
277. It is unclear whether these "guidelines" are intended to be advisory or
mandatory. Normally, the use of the word "guidelines" rather than "regulations" or
"requirements" would suggest that the role of DCD in classifying natural resource
land is purely advisory. Compare In re Marriage of Lee, 57 Wash. App. 268, 788 P.2d
564 (1990), with Cornejo v. State, 57 Wash. App. 314, 788 P.2d 554 (1990); San Juan
County v. Department of Natural Resources, 28 Wash. App. 796, 626 P.2d 995, rev.
denied, 95 Wash. 2d 1029. However, subsection (3) states that the guidelines "shall be
minimum guidelines that apply to all jurisdictions, but also shall allow for regional
differences that exist in Washington state." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.050(3)
(West 1991). Immediately following that statement, the statute backs down from the
apparent preemptive force of these guidelines by stating that the "intent of these
guidelines is to assist counties and cities in designating the classification" of resource
lands. Id (emphasis added). It is unclear as to whether these guidelines are binding
on local government because they are "minimum" standards or whether they are only
advisory to "assist" local government, but can be ignored to account for "regional
differences."
278. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 365-190-020 (Supp. 1991) (emphasis added).
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liability. Indeed, several recent cases illustrate the significant
takings implications raised by the GMA policies of prohibiting
development of wetland areas. For example, in Loveladies
Harbor, Inc. v. United States,279 the deprivation of all economi-
cally viable use of the wetlands portion of a property was held
a compensable taking even though most of the original two
hundred fifty acre tract had been developed. The court mea-
sured the difference in value before and after the government
action and found the substantial diminution in value of wet-
lands property sufficient grounds for a taking.80 Moreover,
the court rejected the notion that filling a wetland is a nui-
sance activity that could be precluded without regard to the
compensation requirement of the Fifth Amendment.
281
The contention can be made that an owner has never had
a right to fill and develop wetlands and thus has not lost any-
thing when government precludes such activity. However,
such an argument cannot stand because the filling of wetlands
has not been a common law nuisance. The very existence of
legislative protections of wetlands indicates that common law
nuisance principles were insufficient to prevent the filling of
weltands in the past. As explained in Florida Rock Industries,
Inc. v. United States, 2 2 it is perfectly appropriate for the gov-
ernment to "draw[] a line in time" and no longer allow an
activity to begin which was once allowed." 3 But to do so, "may
indicate, as it does in this case, that a single plaintiff should not
bear a burden that should be borne by the public at large. 25
Accordingly, in F/orida Rock, the court concluded that mining
could not be considered a common law nusiance that could be
prohibited without any takings implications because mining is
279. 21 Cl. Ct. 153 (1990).
280. The diminution in value was over 99%. Id. at 160. See also Formanek v.
United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 332 (1992) (finding diminution in value from $933,921 to
$112,000).
281. Loveladies, 21 Cl. Ct. at 154. See James S. Burling, Property Rights,
Endangered Species, Wetlands and Other Critters-Is It Against Nature to Pay for a
Taking? 27 LAND & WATER L. REV. 309 (1992).
282. 21 Cl. Ct. 161, 154 (1990). See also Gil v. Inland Wetlands & Watercourses
Agency of Greenwich, 593 A.2d 1368 (Conn. 1991) (finding that property owner had
reasonable expectation of being able to build on wetlands, but failed to show that no
development would be allowed); Vatalaro v. Department of Environmental Regulation,
601 So. 2d 1223 (Fla. 1992) (finding that denial of septic permit in wetland caused a
taking of the property).
283. Florida Rock, 21 Cl. Ct. at 169.
284. Id.
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allowed on other property.2" Similarly, the Supreme Court in
Lucas found that the prohibition on building a home could not
be insulated from a takings challenge on some harm prevent-
ing rationale because "the statute permits owners of existing
structures to remain."' "
Hence, because wetlands have been filled in times past,
regulation cannot escape a takings challenge on the notion that
the property owner never had the right to develop wetlands.
Moreover, that argument has even less appeal when applied to
buffers for wetlands and other critical areas, such as wildlife
conservation areas. The need for wildlife conservation areas
and wetlands is due to development by society at large. The
Just Compensation Clause should be invoked to ensure that
society in general pays the cost for meeting the public's desire
to preserve or conserve rather than placing that cost solely on
those who still own wetlands or wildlife habitat areas.287
A key takings issue that is likely to arise as a result of
restrictions for critical areas is the relevant parcel issue.288 For
example, if a portion of a parcel is designated as a critical area
and buffer zone, but the remaining portion of the parcel is not
so designated and may be put to productive use, has there been
a taking of the regulated portion? This is an open question
but, as discussed previously, Lucas strongly suggests that
requiring property to be left in its natural state, for example,
as a wetland or wildlife habitat, may result in a taking of the
regulated portion even though the owner may retain use of the
remaining portions of its property. 89 The GMA critical areas
requirement is likely to be a fertile ground for litigation on
this point.
Critical area and buffer zone restrictions are also suscepti-
ble to a claim that such designations result in a taking of a con-
servation easement. The Fifth Amendment protects any
285. Id, at 167.
286. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2898 n.11 (emphasis in original).
287. One of the problems in prohibiting development in wildlife conservation
areas is that the supply of wildlife habitat has decreased because society generally has
allowed the conversion of property to other uses. In placing blame, those individuals
who should be exonerated are those owning property that is still suitable for habitat.
Nevertheless, the regulation for protecting wildlife habitat is likely to place all of the
burden on those individuals who, by definition, are not the ones to blame. The
Washington Supreme Court recognized this principle in a different context in San
Telmo Assoc. v. Seattle, 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
288. See discussion of relevant parcel issue supra part II.B.2.b.
289. Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2894 n.7; see discussion supra part II.B.2.b.
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distinct property interests recognized by state law, 2 and
Washington recognizes conservation easements as distinct
interests in real property. The Revised Code of Washington
(RCW) 64.04.130 provides:
A development right, easement, covenant, restriction, or
other right, or any interest less than the fee simple, to pro-
tect, preserve, maintain, improve, restore, limit the future
use of, or conserve for open space purposes, any land or
improvement on the land, whether the right or interest be
appurtenant or in gross, may be held or acquired by any
state agency, federal agency, county, city, town, or metropol-
itan municipal corporation, or nonprofit nature conservancy
corporation. Any such right or interest shall be classified as
real property." 1
This statute treats the transfer of a right for the purpose of
conservation as a separate and legally recognizable interest in
property. Because a conservation easement is a distinct inter-
est in property, local government runs a risk that by imposing
restrictions to conserve critical areas for the public good, it
may take a conservation easement even though it has not
taken a fee simple interest in the property.2 2 While an ease-
ment presumably has less value than the entire fee, the ease-
ment is not without value and compensation should be
required .2 3  The conservation easement argument is particu-
290. For instance, the Supreme Court in Webb's Fabulous Pharmacies, Inc. v.
Beckwith, 449 U.S. 155 (1980), held that a law which allowed the government to keep
the interest earned from money deposited in an interpleader action caused a taking of
that interest income in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The Court found that
interest on a deposited sum of money was a property interest under state law and,
therefore, protected by the Fifth Amendment. Similarly, the Court in Lucas expressly
recognized that easements could be distinct property interests taken by government
regulation even if the entire property is not. The Court stated:
The many statutes on the books, both state and federal, that provide for
the use of eminent domain to impose servitudes on private scenic lands
preventing developmental uses, or to acquire such lands altogether, suggest
the practical equivalence in this setting of negative regulation and
appropriation.
Lucas, 112 S. Ct. at 2895.
291. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 64.04.130 (West Supp. 1993).
292. For instance, in Austin v. Teague, 570 S.W. 389 (Tex. 1978), the court found
that a scenic easement was taken by denial of a permit application. The City "by
indirection acquired the scenic easement at no cost" and was, therefore, liable for a
taking of that easement. Id. at 394.
293. In McLennan v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 102 (1991), aff'd, 994 F.2d 839 (Fed.
Cir. 1993), the Internal Revenue Service denied a tax deduction for a property owner
who conveyed a scenic easement for conservation to a charitable organization. The
easement restricted some uses of the land but allowed others, including the right to
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larly applicable to critical areas and buffers because the ease-
ment has a distinct geographic border and is imposed for the
general public benefit of conservation.
Restrictions on the use of land to protect critical areas may
turn out to be the primary subject on which takings battles are
waged. Unlike resource protections, which can be imposed
only if owners are left with economically viable use of their
land, the GMA does not similarly protect landowners subject
to critical area restrictions. Local government can avoid the
takings implications of critical areas restrictions only by limit-
ing the extent and scope of regulation.
D. Precondemnation Blight
Several provisions of the GMA direct local jurisdictions to
make plans to acquire suitable property for various public pur-
poses. For example, land for open space corridors within and
between urban growth areas may be acquired for recreation,
wildlife habitat, trails, and connection of critical areas.' Simi-
larly, cities and counties are required to estimate an acquisition
date for lands identified as useful for utility and transportation
corridors, landfills, sewage treatment facilities, recreation,
schools, and other public uses." 5 In the same mode, essential
public facilities, which are typically difficult to site, such as air-
ports and correctional facilities, must be identified and sited.29
All of these statutes raise potential takings implications
under the doctrine commonly known as planning blight or
precondernnation blight. Planning or precondennation blight
generally refers to the
detrimental conditions that befall land slated for public
acquisition. Either the project is undesireable and depresses
values for some distance around its proposed boundaries, or,
whatever the nature of the project, the affected land will
surely be taken (or so the market believes) and hence,
becomes virtually useless to the private sector of the
build several homes. The court ruled that the easement was a separate interest in
property that had value, and the owners of the property were entitled to a deduction
on their income taxes.
294. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.160 (West 1991 & Supp. 1993). The county
or city may seek to acquire the open space corridors by purchase of the fee simple or
lesser interests. Id.
295. Id § 36.70A.150.
296. Id. § 36.70A.200 (including state education facilities, state or regional
transportation facilities, solid waste handling facilities, mental health facilities, and
group homes).
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market.-
Many states have recognized that a taking may occur
through precondemnation planning activities.3 Typically,
precondemnation blight occurs where there is unreasonable
delay between a government's announced intention to acquire
a particular property and the actual acquisition.m For exam-
ple, announcing plans to acquire property for future highway
expansion and placing the property on a reservation map for
such purposes may depress land values and result in a
taking.3 0 0
The Washington State Supreme Court has not yet held
that unreasonable delay or other preacquisition planning activ-
ities may result in a de facto taking of property.30 ' However,
the court recognized in Lange v. State30 2 that precondemnation
297. Gideon Kanner, Developments in Eminent Domain.: A Candle in the Dark
Corner of the Law, 52 J. URB. L. 861, 891-92 (1975).
298. See generally Gideon Kanner, Condemnation Blight: Just How Just Is Just
Compensation?, 48 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 765 (Apr. 1973). See also Klopping v.
Whittier, 500 P.2d 1345 (Cal. 1972); Textron, Inc. v. Wood, 355 A.2d 307 (Conn. 1974);
Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 545 P.2d 105 (Or. 1976); Commonwealth
Dep't of Transp. v. DiFurio, 555 A.2d 1379 (Pa. 1989); Brookings v. Mills, 412 N.W.2d
497 (S.D. 1987); Smith v. San Francisco, 275 Cal. Rptr. 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990); In re
Virginia Park, 328 N.W.2d 602 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982); Mentzel v. Oshkosh, 432 N.W.2d
609 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
299. See, e.g., Martino v. Santa Clara Valley Water District, 703 F.2d 1141, 1147
(9th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 847 (1983) (finding that unreasonable delays or
conduct in the acquisition process may constitute a taking); Richmond Elks Hall v.
Richmond Redevelopment, 561 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding taking where
public project directly and substantially interferes with property rights and thereby
impairs value); Jones v. People ex rel. Dep't of Trans., 583 P.2d 165, 171 (Cal. 1978).
300. See Joint Ventures v. Department of Trans., 563 So. 2d 622 (Fla. 1990) (ten
year map reservation for possible highway expansion); Orlando/Orange County
Expressway Auth. v. W&F Agrigrowth-Fernfield, Ltd., 582 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1991)
(upholding summary judgment for temporary taking liability from the filing of a
reservation map); Lincoln Loan Co. v. State Highway Comm'n, 545 P.2d 105 (Or. 1976)
(upholding cause of action for condemnation blight where complaint alleged that over
ten year period the Highway Commission published notice that property would be
taken for transportation purposes); but see Selby Realty Co. v. San Buenaventura, 514
P.2d 111 (Cal. 1973) (holding adoption of general plan with proposed extension of
residential street not a taking).
301. See Orion Corp. v. State, 109 Wash. 2d 621, 747 P.2d 1062 (1987), cert denied,
486 U.S. 1022 (1988) (choosing not to recognize "at this time" a cause of action based on
oppressive preacquisition conduct).
302. 86 Wash. 2d 585, 547 P.2d 282 (1976). See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 8.26.180(3) (West 1992) ("Any decrease or increase in the fair market value of the
real property to be acquired prior to the date of valuation caused by the public
improvement for which such property is acquired . . . will be disregarded in
determining the compensation for the property."); United States v. Virginia Elec. and
Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 636 (1961) ("It would be manifestly unjust to permit a public
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activities may be so closely connected to the falling market
value of a property slated for acquisition that the measure of
just compensation must be based on the earlier value. Lange
established the principle in Washington that precondemnation
activities have a bearing on property values and should be con-
sidered when determining the measure of compensation. In
the same manner, Lange provides the foundation for Washing-
ton to recognize that precondemnation activities may have
such an effect on property values that a de facto taking results,
requiring compensation through an inverse condemnation
action.
The numerous directives in the GMA for local agencies to
identify properties to be slated for public acquisition are likely
to raise precondennation blight questions. For example, if a
particular property is publicly identified for acquisition, private
development or sale becomes economically infeasible, yet sub-
stantial delay and uncertainty in the acquisition process could
persist because of lack of funds or other reasons. Where such
precondemnation activities cause substantial property devalua-
tion, the situation will be ripe for Washington courts to recog-
nize an inverse condemnation cause of action.
E. Impact Fees
The GMA provides authority for cities and counties to
finance public facilities by imposing impact fees on develop-
ment projects. 3 Specifically, impact fees are authorized for
public streets and roads, parks, open space, schools, fire protec-
tion, and recreation facilities.'s 4 The intent is for new growth
and development to pay a proportionate share of the cost of
authority to depreciate property values by a threat .. .of the construction of a
government project and then to take advantage of this depression in the price which it
must pay for the property when eventually condemned.") (quoting 1 L. ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN § 105 at 447 (2d ed. 1953)).
303. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050-090 (West Supp. 1992). After July 1,
1993, impact fees may only be collected if the local jurisdiction has a comprehensive
plan adopted in compliance with code requirements. Id § 36.70A.070 (West 1991).
Impact fees are imposed through local ordinances. The GMA still permits impact fees
based on voluntary agreements, permit fees, special assessments, utility charges, and
SEPA and subdivision dedications. Id § 82.02.020 (West 1981).
304. Id. §§ 82.02.050(4), .090(7) (West Supp. 1992). The listed public facilities must
also be addressed in a capital facilities element of a comprehensive land use plan. Id.
§ 82.02.050(4). In order to retain authority to impose impact fees, the capital facilities
plan must identify deficiencies in public facilities serving existing development and the
means by which existing deficiencies will be eliminated within a reasonable period of
time, id. § 82.02.050(4)(a), additional demands placed on existing facilities by new
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new facilities needed to serve the new growth areas 05 How-
ever, local government "must provide for a balance between
impact fees and other sources of public funds and cannot rely
solely on impact fees."'
Two constitutional takings issues are raised by impact fees.
First, are impact fees a constitutional vehicle for raising reve-
nue to finance the types of public facilities specified in the
GMA? Second, assuming that impacts fees are facially consti-
tutional, does the particular fee being imposed on a develop-
ment project comport with constitutional standards? These
questions will be addressed in turn.
1. Impact Fees as a Facial Taking
It is well-settled that exactions imposed as a condition to
receiving a development permit can result in a regulatory tak-
ing in violation of the Fifth Amendment. °7 Under Nollan,
exactions are legitimate only if they mitigate a need or burden
caused by the development project.3°8 If the project is not the
responsible source of the identified problem, a permit condi-
tion that addresses that problem is not a legitimate regulatory
action but an unconstitutional leveraging of the permitting
authority.30
9
Significantly, this nexus requirement involves more than
simply identifying some connection or linkage between a pro-
ject and a social need. Rather, the proposed development must
be a substantial factor in causing the harm so that it is fair to
require the developer to solve the harm.3 1 In other words,
development, id- § 82.02.050(4)(b), and additional facilities required to serve new
development, id. § 82.02.050(4)(c).
305. Id. § 82.02.050(1)(b).
306. Id. § 82.02.050(2).
307. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
308. Id at 835-36. See Pennell v. San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that an exaction must have a "cause-and-effect relationship
between the property use... and the social evil . .
309. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
310. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 15. Although the majority in Pennell found the takings
claim not ripe, and, therefore, did not reach the merits of the takings issue, Justices
Scalia and O'Connor dissented on the ripeness question and went forward to address
the merits of the takings claim. The reasoning of the dissent was not controverted by
the majority. Justice Scalia reiterated that the purpose of the Takings Clause is to
"bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole." Id at 19 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)). Further, he
stated:
Traditional land use regulation . . . does not violate this fairness principle
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there must be an element of responsibility, similar to the prox-
imate cause concept applied in tort law, that justifies placing
liability on the developer.
Applying this nexus analysis to the GMA calls into ques-
tion the constitutionality of impact fees for schools, open space,
recreation areas, and other population serving facilities. For
example, while there is an obvious "connection" between hous-
ing developments and schools, can it be said that housing
developments cause the need for schools? Arguably not.
Schools, open space, parks and recreation facilities serve peo-
ple, not housing developments. Indeed, a subdivision is built to
respond to the housing needs of people just as a school is built
to meet the education needs of people. In short, population
growth is the responsible factor in creating the need for more
schools, parks, hospitals, and other public services.
Housing development, however, does not cause population
growth; rather, it is just another symptom of population
growth. Accordingly, the applicant for permits to build homes
is not the responsible cause for society's need for schools and
other public services and should not be singled out to pay spe-
cial fees to help finance those facilities.
Does this mean that all impact fees are unconstitutional?
Certainly not. Dedication requirements or fees to address
needs that are attributable to the project itself, such as streets,
curbs, gutters, lighting, and sewers, are properly imposed.
However, where an exaction is not part of the project, but
instead addresses a more general community concern, the bur-
den should be paid for through taxes, not development fees.
Washington case law has long recognized this distinction. In
Hillis Homes, Inc. v. Snohomish County,3 1 1 the Washington
State Supreme Court considered two local ordinances that
required new subdivisions to pay fees for parks, schools, and
fire protection.312 The court reasoned that "[n]either ordinance
makes any provision for regulation of residential develop-
ments. Therefore, it appears that the primary purpose, if not
because there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the property use
restricted by the regulation and the social evil that the regulation seeks to
remedy. Since the owner's use of the property is (or, but for the regulation,
would be) the source of the social problem, it cannot be said that he has been
singled out unfairly.
I at 20.
311. 97 Wash. 2d 804, 650 P.2d 193 (1982).
312. Id at 806-07, 650 P.2d at 194.
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the only purpose of both ordinances, is to raise revenue rather
than to regulate residential developments. For this reason, we
hold that the ordinances impose a tax."'
31
Similarly, in San Telmo Associates v. Seattle,114 a develop-
ment fee to help finance a city housing fund was defended as
"merely a regulation on development. ' 315 The court responded
that the "municipal body cannot shift the social costs of devel-
opment on to a developer under the guise of regulation.
s3 1
Properly understood, impact fees are a regulatory device
imposed through the police power (not the taxation power)
and thus may be imposed only if they actually regulate the
development itself. Fees for general community needs such as
schools or recreation facilities, however, do not regulate the
development but are simply a politically acceptable off-budget
way to raise revenue to pay for various public facilities that are
needed by a growing population."1 7 If these development fees
are not legitimate regulatory devices, then, unless otherwise
authorized and uniformly applied as a tax, collection of such
fees is a taking under Nollan.
The danger of allowing development fees for financing
general public facilities is that it opens the door for an unlim-
ited array of fees to finance all sorts of social agendas. For
example, in Commercial Builders of Northern California v.
Sacramento,31 8 the court upheld a fee imposed on commercial
projects to help finance a city low-income housing fund. The
majority concluded that there was a sufficient link between
commercial development and an increased demand for low-
income housing on the theory that commercial development
would facilitate job opportunities for low-income workers who
might migrate to Sacramento and need affordable housing. 19
In a sharp dissenting opinion, Judge Beezer argued that the
housing fee ordinance was "a transparent attempt to force
313. Id. at 810, 650 P.2d at 196.
314. 108 Wash. 2d 20, 735 P.2d 673 (1987).
315. Id. at 24, 735 P.2d at 674.
316. Id. at 24, 735 P.2d at 675.
317. Pennell, 485 U.S. at 22 (Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Commercial Builders
of Northern California v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991) (Beezer, J.,
dissenting) (stating that "legislators find it politically more palatable to exact
payments from developers than to tax their constituents"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997
(1992).
318. 941 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992).
319. Id. at 874.
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commercial developers to underwrite social policy. 3 20 Thus,
[t]he new workers attracted by the new jobs associated with
the new development surely will increase the demand for all
manner of goods and services. If Sacramento has shown a
sufficient causal connection in this case, we can be expected
next to uphold exactions imposed on developers to subsidize
small business retailers, child-care programs, food services
and health care delivery systems.
321
Judge Beezer's concerns are not hollow portends.
Already, Los Angeles has adopted ordinances creating an Arts
Development Fee and Trust Fund that requires developers to
pay the city up to one percent of their building valuation to
help support art projects. 2 The enactment of the Town of
Greenfield, California, is more extreme. Located in the Salinas
Valley, this small town reportedly requires residential develop-
ers to include two bicycles with each newly constructed
house.323 The nexus? New development is associated with air
pollution and, of course, bicycle use reduces air pollution. The
requirement has been imposed on at least two new develop-
ments.3 24 As Judge Beezer suggested, "state and local govern-
ments have begun to stretch the use of exactions to the
breaking point."3 2
5
Not far removed from the Greenfield ordinance is Wash-
ington's Mobile Home Relocation Assistance Act, which autho-
rizes local governments to adopt ordinances requiring mobile
home park operators to pay tenant relocation assistance to dis-
placed tenants as a condition to leaving the mobile home park
business.3 2' Although property owners are not responsible for
causing the low-income status of tenants, such a fee requires
the property owner to address the financial needs of tenants.
Under the analysis outlined above, the constitutionality of such
a requirement is clearly suspect. 27
320. Id. at 876 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
321. Id. at 878.
322. Los ANGELES, CAL., ORDINANCE, §§ 166,724 and 166,725 (Mar. 8, 1991).
323. See Town Pledge: 2 Bikes in Every Home, SACRAMENTO UNION, Feb. 20, 1992,
at A5.
324. The Greenfield mayor admits: "I don't know whether they'll use the bikes or
hock them and take the money and run. But at least we're doing something about this
brown air in Salinas Valley." Id.
325. Commercial Builders, 941 F.2d at 877 (Beezer, J., dissenting).
326. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. ch. 59.21 (West 1990 & Supp. 1991).
327. See Guimont v. Clarke, 121 Wash. 2d 625, 854 P.2d 23 (1993).
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2. Constitutionality of Fees as Applied to Particular
Properties
Although population growth, not housing development, is
logically the responsible factor causing the need for additional
public facilities, the GMA assumes that fees for such purposes
are facially constitutional. The next question is whether the
particular fee imposed on a project complies with constitu-
tional standards. Fortunately, the provisions in the GMA
attempt to ensure that particular fees are not excessive. For
example, the statement of legislative intent provides that new
growth and development only pay a proportionate share of the
cost of new facilities. 328 The legislature further declared its
intent that impact fees are to be imposed only through "estab-
lished procedures and criteria so that specific developments do
not pay arbitrary or duplicative fees for the same impact. ' 329
The GMA provides a three-pronged statutory standard that
must be met in order to impose any fee. An impact fee (1) may
only be imposed for system improvements that are reasonably
related to the new development, (2) may not exceed a propor-
tionate share of the costs of system improvements that are rea-
sonably related to the new development, and (3) must be used
for system improvements that will reasonably benefit the new
development.330
The key constitutional issue raised is whether the applica-
tion of the "reasonably related" standard will result in imposi-
tion of fees that fail to meet the heightened scrutiny
"substantial advancement" test of Nollan. The phrase "reason-
ably related to new development" is clarified, however, by the
GMA's definition of "impact fee." To be reasonably related,
the local government must show that the new development
"creates additional demand and need for public facilities. ' 331
Overall, the GMA demonstrates an intent to limit and
closely scrutinize impact fees to ensure that they are justified
328. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 82.02.050(1)(b) (West Supp. 1992).
329. Id. § 82.02.050(1)(c). The local ordinance must allow the fee to be adjusted to
account for unusual circumstances in particular cases to ensure that impact fees are
imposed fairly. Id. § 82.02.060(4). The developer may submit studies and data to justify
an adjustment to the fee amount. Id § 82.02.060(5).
330. Id. § 82.02.050(3).
331. Id. § 82.02.090(1). See also Miller v. Port Angeles, 38 Wash. App. 904, 691 P.2d
229 (1984), which holds that fees for road improvements that are "directly related" to
the traffic generated by the development are permissible regulatory measures, not
taxes. Id. at 910, 234 P.2d at 234.
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and proportional to the actual impacts caused by the project. If
this intent is followed, local governments may avoid potential
takings.33 2 However, if fees are imposed where only a minor or
indirect nexus exists, Nollan's takings limitation applies. In
addition, local governments may be tempted to or may improp-
erly impose fees where mitigation has already been provided
through another mechanism, or may improperly place the bur-
dens of pre-existing deficiencies onto new growth, or may shift
public burdens onto the developer that are unrelated to the
project. In any of these situations, local governments risk vio-
lating the constitutional standards in Nollan.
F Transportation Requirements
A major policy theme of the comprehensive plan is the
concept of "concurrency." The concurrency requirement pro-
hibits new growth unless transportation improvements are
concurrently developed to accommodate the increased traffic
impact.333 Two potential takings issues are likely to arise.
1. Temporary Takings
Under the GMA concurrency policy, the capacity of the
existing transportation system can limit or delay development.
The potential takings question is whether such delay causes a
"temporary taking." The leading case on this issue is First
English Evangelical Luthern Church of Glendale v. Los Ange-
les,31 which established that temporary takings are no differ-
ent in principle from permanent takings. The general rule is
that if a government regulation denies all economically viable
use, then the owner will be entitled to compensation for the
time the regulation was in effect.33 5 However, not all govern-
ment delays of development will cause a compensable tempo-
rary taking. The Supreme Court in First Church recognized
that "normal delays in obtaining building permits, changes in
332. Judge Beezer indicated that on-site and off-site improvements (e.g., roads,
schools, parks, and sewage treatment plants) are generally upheld. Commercial
Builders of Northern California v. Sacramento, 941 F.2d 872, 872 (9th Cir. 1991)
(Beezer, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1997 (1992). Here, the requirement
solves a problem actually caused by the development and the development is also
directly benefitted or served by the improvement.
333. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 36.70A.070(6)(e) (West 1991).
334. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
335. Id at 319. See also Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886
(1992) (recognizing temporary taking as basis for jurisdiction where permanent taking
was not ripe for judicial review).
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zoning ordinances, variances, and the like" are not temporary
takings.3 6  The delay must be unreasonable, excessive, or
extraordinary. 1
7
The key to determining whether a temporary prohibition
on development due to transportation inadequacies is a normal
delay rather than an unreasonable or extraordinary delay,
should be whether the government entity is acting in good
faith to solve the transportation deficiency within a reasonable
period of time.m If the local government does not act in good
faith to solve the infrastructure needs within a reasonable
period of time, the burden of the problem becomes placed
solely on those landowners who have not yet developed their
property. As stated by the California Supreme Court in
upholding a temporary building moratorium, "[w]e must pre-
sume that the City... will attempt in good faith" to solve the
problem.33 9 However, if the local government establishes
unrealistic or unattainable traffic standards, new development
can be unfairly delayed or completety foreclosed without a
good faith or realistic attempt to solve the underlying problem.
The traffic issue then becomes merely an excuse for prevent-
ing some owners from being able to make use of their prop-
erty. This should result in a temporary taking under First
Church and Lucas.
2. Mitigation Requirements
A second issue is the reasonableness of traffic improve-
ment requirements placed upon specific projects. Nollan
applies to the mitigation of traffic impacts. Under Nollan, mit-
igation requirements may be imposed only to address the
actual impacts on traffic caused by the particular project.340
336. First Church, 482 U.S. at 321. See also Valley View Indus. Park v. Redmond,
107 Wash. 2d 621, 733 P.2d 182 (1987) (recognizing the possibility of interim taking but
not for mere delay in processing permit applications).
337. See Norco Construction Inc. v. King County, 801 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir.
1986).
338. See Associated Home Builders of the Greater Eastbay, Inc. v. Livermore, 18
Cal.3d 582, 610 (Cal. 1976).
339. Id. See TOCCO v. New Jersey Council on Affordable Housing, 576 A.2d 328
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1389 (1991) (holding that
eighteen month development moratorium not a taking where purpose of moratorium
was to allow municipality opportunity to meet fair share obligations for low and
moderate income housing).
340. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837.
Cobb v. Snohomish County, 64 Wash. App. 451, 818 P.2d 1106 (1991) (opinion
withdrawn from publication in Pacific Reporter), demonstrates the case specific impact
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However, the temptation may be to have particular projects
mitigate transportation problems associated with the region as
a whole and not caused by the particular development or sub-
division at issue. In such a scenario, singling out a particular
project to be delayed or, alternatively, requiring that that pro-
ject provide the improvement, is an illegitimate exaction under
Nollan.
V. CONCLUSION
The difference between federal and state law protections
of individuals' property rights creates great uncertainty for
property owners, government officials, and their attorneys.
Because the Washington State Supreme Court's latest declara-
tions on takings law protection is on shaky ground, litigation
should focus on the more solid foundation provided by the
United States Supreme Court in Lucas.
How the takings principles will interact with the GMA
remains to be seen. Only when the GMA is implemented and
local regulations are adopted will it become clear whether any
property is taken by them. Fortunately, the GMA gives local
government the opportunity to be flexible, to avoid imposing
harsh burdens on property owners, and to retain existing prop-
erty values. Devaluation by downzoning and other extreme
restrictions on productive uses are not mandated. Good public
policy, fiscal responsibility, and fairness suggest that local gov-
ernment should seize the opportunities within the context of
the GMA to avoid constitutional violations and the accompany-
ing financial burdens on the local taxpayers. But if the oppor-
tunities to be flexible are ignored and burdens are inequitably
shifted to private landowners, the responsible government
entity must be prepared to answer the command of the Just
Compensation Clause.
analysis required for determining whether a traffic mitigation requirement is
legitimate. In Cobb, a proposed development did not have any traffic impact on lanes
that were operating at a level of service (LOS) D, but instead contributed traffic to
other lanes at the same intersection that were operating at better than LOS D. Id. at
455. Under the Snohomish County Code, traffic impacts could be mitigated only if a
LOS of D resulted after completion of the project. Id But because Cobb's
development impacted the intersection generally, which had some lanes at LOS D, the
county decided to require mitigation fees. The court held that the county violated
RCW 82.02.020. I& at 458-59. The court placed burden of proof on the county to show
that the fees were "reasonably necessary" to mitigate direct impacts of the
development. Id. at 459.
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